Essays on monetary policy by Nguyen, Anh D.M.
Essays on Monetary Policy
Anh Dinh Minh Nguyen
Department of Economics
Lancaster University
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
subject of Economics at Lancaster University
November 2015
To my family.
Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and that it has not been submitted for any
other degree.
Anh Dinh Minh Nguyen
November 2015
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I am very grateful to my supervisors, Prof. David Peel and Dr. Efthymios
Pavlidis, for their constant and enthusiastic instructions, inspiring discussions, and valuable
comments on my chapters. I have been fortunate to have opportunities to work with them
and hope to have more chances to cooperate with them in the future.
I would like to express my appreciation to Prof. Ivan Paya for his suggestions on my
work as well as support during my time at the department. I thank all the staff members
of the department for making a stimulating and pleasurable working environment and the
manager of the High Performance Cluster, Mike Pacey, for his assistance. I would also like
to thank my PhD fellows at the department whose friendship has made my adventure more
interesting and enjoyable.
In addition, I spent one year visiting at the Department of Economics, the University of
Manchester which advanced my knowledge and helped me acquire necessary skills for my
PhD study and future career as well. My particular thanks go to Chris Orme for leading me
to the beautiful land of econometric theory. I also thank all staff members there for useful
and interesting lectures and support as well.
The internship at the International Monetary Fund also provided a great chance for me
to improve my knowledge on monetary policy and to have first-hand experience on policy-
oriented studies on developing countries. I specially thank Dr. Oral Williams, Dr. Filiz
Unsal and Dr. Jemma Dridi for their instructions. My thanks also to the staff of African
department for their willingness to help me whenever I needed it.
I would also like to thank Prof. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Dr. Raffaele Rossi, Dr. Giorgio
Motta, Dr. Konstantinos Theodoridis, Dr. John Whittaker, Dr. Benjamin Born, Dr. Jo-
iv
hannes Pfeifer, Dr. Mihnea Constantinescu, and participants at RES (2015), SES (2015),
ECOBATE (2014), RES Easter School (2014), IMF seminar, Bank of Lithuania seminar,
and Department seminars for useful discussions and suggestions.
I give the greatest thanks to my family. My parents, Huan and Yen, and my brother,
Nhat, have always given me love, support, and encouragements. And a great appreciation
to a wonderful woman, my wife- Anh, who has touched my life and provided me with
enormous support. I therefore dedicate this thesis to my family as a thankfulness for all of
wonderful things they have done for me.
I am glad to acknowledge that this work was supported by the Economic and Social
Research Council under the grant ES/J500094/1.
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays which aim to evaluate the role played by monetary pol-
icy in economic outcomes. The first two essays investigate the properties of the historical
conduct of monetary policy in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, and
justify how these properties are related to economic performance. The third essay analyzes
the impact of changes in the volatility of monetary policy shocks on the economy using a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Monetary policy has been shown to have short-run non-neutral effects on the real economy
(see, e.g, the vast literature on New Keynesian economics, as discussed at length in Wood-
ford, 2003) and, for this reason, studying its practice has been increasingly attracting the
interests of both policymakers and academics. This thesis comprises three essays which
aim to evaluate the role played by monetary policy in economic outcomes. Specifically,
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the features of the historical conduct of monetary policy in the
United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, and discuss how these features are re-
lated to economic performance. Chapter 4 develops a DSGE model with financial frictions
to analyze the impact of changes in the volatility of monetary policy shocks on the economy.
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 investigates U.K. monetary policy under the infla-
tion targeting regime, which was introduced in October 1992, with the aim of explaining the
low and stable rates of inflation observed in this regime. The model specifications are based
on a Taylor rule in which the interest rate is assumed to respond symmetrically to the devi-
ation of inflation from its target and the deviation of output from the potential level. A vari-
ety of Taylor-rule-type reaction functions are taken into consideration including backward-,
contemporaneous-, and forward-looking models in order to seek the one explaining best
the movement of interest rate. While most of studies on U.K. monetary policy use ex-post
data, this work relies on real-time data for analysis. As argued by Orphanides (2001), using
ex-post data might mislead the description of past policy and conceal the behavior proposed
2by the information available to central bankers in real time. While estimating backward-
looking rules is straightforward, the estimation of contemporaneous- and forward-looking
rules are problematic due to lack of current and future data in real time. To deal with this
issue, the study employs the two-step strategy introduced by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011).
The first step is to construct the forecasts required. The second step is to use those forecasts
for the estimation. Moreover, in order to obtain the estimates which are robust to outliers,
the study introduces the impulse-indicator saturation (IIS), which is proposed by Hendry
(1999), to the standard Taylor rules. Three main findings are obtained. First, the robust
characteristics of monetary policy under inflation targeting are forward-looking and raising
the interest rate by more than one-to-one to changes in inflation, thus satisfying the Tay-
lor principle. Second, the granting of operational independence to the Bank of England in
1997 appears to have led to a stronger response to inflation. Third, dealing with outliers is
important in the evaluation of monetary policy. Failing to do so can result in an improper
interpretation that the post-1992 response to inflation was weak, below unity, perhaps not
satisfying the Taylor principle. These results are therefore in line with the view that mone-
tary policy has contributed to stabilize inflation in the U.K.
Chapter 3 turns the focus to U.S. monetary policy. Specifically, it investigates how the
conduct of monetary policy has changed since the late 1960s. An important contribution of
this chapter is to simultaneously take into account the four issues highlighted as important
in modeling monetary policy: the type of time-variation in policy parameters, the treatment
of heteroscedasticity, the real-time nature of data, and the role of asymmetric preferences.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that allows for all four features simulta-
neously. The empirical model is built on the derived optimal rule from the formal monetary
policy design problem in which central bankers show asymmetric loss function as described
in Nobay and Peel (2003). Following Boivin (2006), in this empirical model, parameters
are allowed to be time-varying to capture potential changes in the conduct of policy. The
issue of heteroscedasticity, which is emphasized by Sims and Zha (2006), is dealt with by
letting the standard deviation of policy shocks to follow a stochastic volatility process. The
model is then written in a non-linear state-space form which is estimated with real-time data
3using particle filtering. Our results suggest that the conduct of U.S. monetary policy expe-
rienced considerable changes at the mid and late 1970s, and the early 1990s. The timing
of the changes are consistent with the view that monetary variables impact on economic
performance.
A key finding of Chapter 3 is that the volatility of monetary policy shocks and, hence,
the uncertainty of monetary policy have changed overtime. Such a result is also supported
by the vast literature on macroeconomic volatility (for instance, Fernández-Villaverde et al.,
2010a; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008). Nonetheless, only a few studies have analyzed the
impact of changes in the volatility of monetary policy on real activity. Shedding light on
this issue is the goal of Chapter 4. An important contribution of the chapter is to investigate
how financial frictions influence the transmission of monetary volatility shocks. To do so,
we develop a standard DSGE model, similar to Smets and Wouters (2007), but incorporate
financial frictions a` la Bernanke et al. (1999) and introduce stochastic volatility to monetary
policy innovations (and to other structural shocks to capture aggregate dynamics). As with
other DSGE models, it is required to solve the model before estimation. However, a solution
to the first-order approximation is certainty-equivalent, which implies that there is no role
for volatility shocks. To this end, the model is solved to a higher-order approximation which
results in a non-linear state-space model. The state-space model is, in turn, estimated with
U.S. data using maximum likelihood in which the value of likelihood is calculated by a
sequential Monte Carlo method. Our results show that, first, the model captures aggregate
dynamics fairly well. Second, an increase in monetary volatility shock leads to a fall in
economic activity. Finally, financial frictions amplify and propagate the transmission of
monetary volatility shocks to the economy via the financial accelerator mechanism.
Chapter 2
U.K. Monetary Policy under Inflation
Targeting
2.1 Introduction
Low and stable rates of inflation have been observed in the U.K. since the early 1990s. This
experience of price stability has been mainly documented as a result of improvements in
the conduct of monetary policy associated with the adoption of inflation targeting in 1992.
Notably, Nelson (2000) estimates U.K. monetary policy reaction functions with ex-post
data using the split-sample approach and find that the post-1992 inflation could be charac-
terized by a forward-looking rule with inflation coefficient being above unity. Therefore,
when inflation increases, monetary policy raises the real interest rate, leading to a reduction
in inflationary pressures. This feature is known as the Taylor principle (Woodford, 2001).
Meanwhile, the 1972− 1976 period of extremely high inflation is captured by a near-zero
response of nominal interest rate to inflation. Also based on ex-post data, Cukierman and
Muscatelli (2008) and Martin and Milas (2004) affirm the anti-inflationary stance of mone-
tary policy under the inflation targeting regime.
However, according to Orphanides (2001), using ex-post data might mislead the descrip-
tion of past policy and conceal the behavior proposed by the information available to central
bankers in real time. The author therefore argues that it is essential to take the real-time na-
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ture of data into consideration when investigating historical episodes of monetary policy. On
the basis of this rationale, we rely on real-time data for our analysis on U.K. monetary pol-
icy under inflation targeting. A variety of Taylor rules are considered including backward-,
contemporaneous-, and forward-looking models. While estimating the backward-looking
model is straightforward, complications arise in the estimation of the other two types of
models because of lack of the contemporaneous- and forward-looking data. For the estima-
tion of U.S. monetary policy rules, Orphanides (2002) uses forecasts from the Greenbook
which is prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff for the Federal Open Market Committee
before every regularly scheduled meeting. For the U.K. economy, we notice that the Bank
of England (henceforth BoE) has produced quarterly forecasts of inflation since 1993. How-
ever, these forecasts appear to reflect the (expected) effect of changes in policy, instead of
the cause of changes. For example, in August 2006, the interest rate was raised to 4.75 per-
cent from 4.5 percent in July and inflation projections in the August 2006 Inflation Report
were based on the value of 4.75, therefore less likely to justify the increase of the interest
rate. In Appendix A.1, we estimate Taylor rules with the BoE’s forecasts and find that the
responses to inflation are wrongly signed. To deal with this data-related issue, we follow
the two-step strategy introduced by Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2011). The first step is to con-
struct the forecasts required. The second step is to use the constructed forecasts to estimate
the contemporaneous- and forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions. Using the
two-step approach is appealing for two reasons. First, it matches with the real-time nature
of data. Second, it bypasses the problem of endogeneity, therefore does not require the use
of instruments given that finding instruments might be problematic (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy,
2011).
In a standard Taylor rule, the interest rate is characterized by a linear function of a con-
stant intercept, the deviation of inflation from its target and the deviation of output from the
potential level. However, policy makers in fact may desire to deviate from such a rule at
some points in time, say, to moderate the economy under unfavorable global conditions or
to respond sporadically to some other variables besides inflation and the output gap, such as
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exchange rates, credit growth, or asset prices.1 These deviations can be considered as out-
liers. To obtain reliable estimates of coefficients of interest, such as the response of monetary
policy to inflation, we need to take the issue of outliers into consideration when evaluating
monetary policy. One proposal is to add dummy variables over the periods of deviations;
however, this approach requires prior knowledge on the timing of deviations which are too
diversified in the real world to identify properly. Another proposal is to incorporate other
variables in addition to inflation and the output gap into the reaction function. However,
unless policy makers take those variables as their policy’s objectives, it is unwise to expand
the framework to include all of them because the inclusion could mislead the estimates of
interest.2 In addition, it is hard to address what “other” variables are.
In order to deal with the above issue, we employ the impulse-indicator saturation (hence-
forth IIS) approach which is introduced by Hendry (1999). Specifically, impulse indicators,
one for every observation, are embedded into the standard Taylor-rule type model to create
a new model that produces robust estimates to outliers (see, Johansen and Nielsen, 2009;
Santos et al., 2008). In this framework, the number of variables (N) equals the number of
observations (T ) plus four (an intercept and coefficients on inflation, output gap, and the lag
of interest rate). Because the proposed model involves more variables than observations,
it cannot be estimated by customary econometric methods. We instead use Autometrics
(Doornik, 2009) which is a method that handles the N > T problem by implementing a
mixture of expanding and contracting searches in order to seek the indicators relevant at a
selected significance level α . The method is analogous to using dummies but not requiring
advanced knowledge about break points.
Our study therefore has two main contributions. First, it enriches the literature on U.K.
monetary policy in terms of type of data (real time data) and methodology (two-step esti-
mation strategy). Second, it considers the issue of outliers carefully, which has been disre-
garded in previous studies, and conducts policy evaluations based on the estimates which
1For example, Kharel et al. (2010) investigate the response of monetary policy to exchange rate fluctuations
and Chadha et al. (2004) consider monetary policy reactions to asset prices and exchange rates.
2For the 1992Q4-2007Q4 period, our model detects only 6 outliers, suggesting that monetary policy mainly
respond to inflation and output gap. Nevertheless, we show that it is important to deal with these outliers.
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are robust to that problem. When it comes to the results, we find that forward-looking rules
capture the post-1992 interest rate movements better than backward- and contemporaneous-
looking rules in both the models with and without IIS. Diagnostic tests, however, reject the
validity of the models without IIS; whereas, forward-looking models with IIS pass all mis-
specification tests. More importantly, failing to do so misleads the features of U.K. monetary
policy under inflation targeting. The long-run response of interest rate to inflation is smaller
than unity in the models without IIS, suggesting that the post-1992 response to inflation
was not satisfying the Taylor principle. In contrast, the response to inflation was larger
than unity in forward-looking models with IIS. Such a difference indicates the importance
of dealing with outliers in evaluating the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, we argue
that monetary policy appears to have responded stronger to inflation since the granting of
operational independence in 1997. Finally, based on these results we provide some possible
explanations for the stability of inflation observed under the inflation targeting regime.
The remaining study is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of
Taylor-rule based model specifications and describes data for the estimation. Section 3 is
about inflation forecasts. Section 4 presents the results. The last section concludes.
2.2 Taylor Rules and Data
2.2.1 Taylor Rule Specifications
The original Taylor (1993) rule has the following simple formula
rt = c+φππt +φxxt , (2.1)
where rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation rate, and xt is the output gap. For
the U.S. economy in the 1984-1992 period, Taylor (1993) specifies that c = 1, φπ = 1.5,
and φx = 0.5 which implies that the federal funds rate increased by 1.5 percent for 1 percent
positive deviation of inflation from the target and 0.5 percent for an increase by 1 percent in
the output gap.
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Clarida et al. (2000) modify (2.1) to capture the forward-looking behavior and the grad-
ual adjustment of the interest rate. The modified Taylor rule has the following form
M1 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+ εt , (2.2)
in which the interest rate responds to the expected changes of inflation and output gap at the
t + p and t + q period by φπ and φx, respectively; ρ is the smoothing parameter; and εt is
the policy shock which is assumed to have mean zero and variance σ2. This type of rule
reflects the ‘leaning against the wind’ view in macroeconomic management.
The specification in (2.2) also nests the backward-looking (such as when h = −1 and
q = −1) and contemporaneous-looking rules ( by setting h = 0 and q = 0). Regarding the
optimal choice of lead structure in the policy rule, it is suggested to be no further than one
year for inflation or beyond the current quarter for output gap (Taylor and Williams, 2011).
Therefore, the maximum values of h and q are set to be 4 and 0, respectively. In addition,
we assume that the expected output gap at time t is equal to the output gap at time t − 1
observed at time t, or Etxt = xt−1|t . This assumption is backed by the fact that the output
gap is significantly inert. Alternatively, the reader can analyze our models as backward-
looking on the output gap. This group of models without IIS is termed M1. We estimate M1
for h =−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q =−1.
We generate a group of models with IIS called M2 by placing impulse indicators into
(2.2) as follows
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt , (2.3)
in which 1i=t is the impulse indicator which has the value of 1 for every i = t and 0 else-
where, other notations are remained as in M1. As it can be seen, M2 has T parameters of
indicators, one for each observation, and four other parameters, including an intercept and
coefficients on inflation, output gap, and the lag of interest rate. M2 involves more variables
than observations (T + 4 against T ), thus cannot be estimated by customary econometric
methods. We instead use Autometrics (Doornik, 2009) which is a method that handles the
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N > T problem by using a mixture of expanding and contracting searches in order to seek
the indicators relevant.
2.2.2 Data
The estimation is executed by using the following data:
• Interest rate: The actual interest rate that is the instrument of the Bank of England has
varied three times since 1992, including the minimum band 1 dealing rate (August
1981- April 1997), the repo rate (May 1997 - July 2006) and the official bank rate
(since August 2007). Meanwhile, the treasury bill rate has moved very closely with
these actual rates over time and is available for the period considered; thus, we follow
(Nelson, 2000) to use the treasury bill rate as a proxy of the policy rate. The end-
of-quarter series is collected from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the
1992Q4-2012Q1 period.
• Output gap: The quarterly output gap is defined as the deviation of the (log) real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from its Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend. The quarterly
real GDP data is obtained from the real-time GDP database of the Office for Na-
tional Statistics (ONS) and seasonally adjusted. It covers the vintages from 1992Q4 to
2012Q1. Moreover, we use the real-time quadratic output gap for robustness checks.
• Inflation rate: The inflation rate is the annual percentage change of the quarterly
Retail Price Index (RPI) published by the ONS. We use both quarterly and monthly
frequency. The former is used in backward-looking models and covers the period from
1992Q3 to 2011Q4; whereas the latter spans from 1988M1 to 2012M2 and is used to
make forecasts of inflation. Besides, eight monthly price index series, which are the
components of the RPI, including the price indexes of food, alcohol and tobacco,
petrol and oil other goods, rent, utilities, shop services, and non-shop services, are
also utilized to make inflation forecasts based on VAR models. The sample for these
components is from 1988M1 to 2012M2.
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2.3 Inflation Forecasts
This section presents how we construct the expected values of inflation in order to estimate
contemporaneous- and forward-looking Taylor rules. The inflation forecasting strategy is
similar to Hendry and Hubrich (2011) who execute 1-month, 6-month and 12-month ahead
forecasts of U.S. inflation from 1970M1 to 2004M12. Specifically, they consider three types
of models to forecast an aggregate like inflation:
1. Models that use only the past information of the aggregate. For example, simple
autoregressive (AR) models;
2. Models that aggregate subcomponent forecasts to obtain aggregate forecasts, which
is also known as indirect forecasts. For instance, vector autoregression models for all
disaggregate components but the aggregate;
3. Models that incorporate disaggregate information directly into the aggregate model.
For instance, vector autoregression models combining the aggregate and all disaggre-
gate factors (VARagg,sub) or a set of selected disaggregate ones.
Hendry and Hubrich (2011) find that the univariate model using only the historical in-
formation of the aggregate dominates other forecasting models in terms of the Root Mean
Square Forecast Error (RMSFE) criterion. In what follows, the study applies the Hendry
and Hubrich (2011)’s approaches to the U.K data. However, we only consider the univari-
ate model and the VARagg,sub model because the indirect forecasting strategy requires the
weights of subcomponents in aggregation which are not available. In addition, we incor-
porate the impulse indicator saturations to avoid systematic forecast failure (Castle et al.,
2013, 2009) and use Autometrics to select the forecasting model from a general unrestricted
model (Doornik, 2009).
2.3.1 Empirical Forecasting Specifications
It is known that the inflation rate of the reference month is released with one month delay. In
other words, at time t (month), only the inflation rate of time t−1 and earlier are observed.
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The study aims to forecast the inflation at time t (nowcasting) and the next 12 months (t +
12), using the dynamic (ex-ante) forecasting method. As it is aforementioned, the two
models considered are: [A] -the univariate model and [B] -the VAR model combining the
aggregate and all disaggregate factors. The general unrestricted model specifications at each
forecast origin are as follows
A - The univariate model
πt = c+
13
∑
k=1
αkπt−k +
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt ,
in which t = 1, ...,T ; 1i=t is the impulse indicator saturation which has the value of 1
for every i = t and 0 elsewhere; εt = IID{0,σ2}.
B - The VAR model
pt = c+
13
∑
k=1
Ak pt−k +
T
∑
i=1
bi1i=t +ut ,
in which pt = [π,π1,π2,π3,π4,π5,π6,π7,π8]
′
t is the 9×1 vector of aggregate inflation
and its disaggregate components;3 c and Ak are the constant vector and the coefficient
matrix, respectively; bi is the 9× 1 coefficient vector relating to the indicators; t =
1, ...,T ; 1i=t is the impulse indicator which has the value of 1 for every i = t and 0
elsewhere; and the innovation process ut is a zero-mean white noise process with a
time-invariant positive-definite variance-covariance matrix Σ.
2.3.2 Forecasting Performance Comparison
We compare forecasting performance between the univariate and the VAR models for the
1999Q1-2011Q2 period. The forecasts are assumed to be executed at the last month of
every quarter; therefore, there are 49 forecast origins in total. At every forecast origin t, we
conduct thirteen year-on-year monthly inflation forecasts from t to t + 12. We rely on the
RMFSE measure to compare the forecasting performance between the two models.
3π,π1,π2,π3,π4,π5,π6,π7,π8 are the annual percentage changes of the monthly RPI (π) and its eight
components, including food (π1), alcohol and tobacco (π2), petrol and oil (π3), other goods (π4), rent (π5),
utilities (π6), shop services (π7) and non-shop services (π8).
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Table 2.1 Root Mean Square Forecast Error
Model 1999-2011 1999-2004 2005-2011
AR 1.23 0.73 1.69
VARagg,sub 1.58 1.25 1.88
Table 2.2 Other Measures of Forecast Error
Model MAE MAPE
AR 0.96 33.53
VARagg,sub 1.27 55.20
Notes: This table shows two other measures of forecast errors: Mean absolute error (MAE) and mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE).
Table 2.1 shows the RMSFE of each model. The results indicate that it is hard for the
VAR model to defeat the univariate model in forecasting U.K. inflation. This result remains
if we compare forecasting performance in sub-periods: 1999Q1-2004Q4 and 2005Q5-2011Q2
as shown in the same table. Such a result is in line with what Stock and Watson (2007) and
Hendry and Hubrich (2011) find for the U.S. economy. Similarly, Castle et al. (2013) doc-
uments that inflation forecasts using AR-type models have a lower RMSFE than those with
variables, factors, or both. Furthermore, according to Stock and Watson (2010), in terms of
forecasting inflation, simple univariate models are competitive with models using explana-
tory variables.
In addition to the RMSFE, we consider two other measures of forecast error: Mean
absolute error (MAE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and present the results in
Table 2.2. They confirm that the univariate model is more successful in forecasting inflation
in the U.K. For this reason, we use the inflation forecasts from the univariate model to
estimate contemporaneous- and forward-looking reaction functions of monetary policy.
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2.3.3 Expected Quarterly Inflation Rates
To illustrate the process of constructing the quarterly series of Etπt+h for h = 0 to h = 4,
we use the forecasts obtained at the 1992M12 forecast origin as an example. It should be
noted that the inflation rate of 1992M10 and 1992M11 are observed at 1992M12. At that
origin, there are 13 forecasts carried out including the year-on-year inflation of that month,
1992M12, and the next 12 months from 1993M1 to 1993M12. We choose the (nowcasted)
forecasted inflation rate of 1992M12 to be the expected contemporaneous inflation rate of
1992Q4, Etπt . Meanwhile, the expected one-quarter-ahead inflation rate, Etπt+1, equals
the forecasted inflation rate of 1993M3. The expected two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead
inflation rates are computed in a similar way.
2.4 Results
In order to highlight the important characteristics of monetary policy under the inflation tar-
geting regime, we exclude the recent crisis period from the sample in the first step. Nonethe-
less, given the flexibility of the IIS method, we later extend the analysis to include the post-
2007 sample in the estimation. This is executed as a robustness check to the method used
and the results obtained. We also investigate if the conduct of monetary policy was different
before and after the granting of operational independence to the BoE. Furthermore, based
on the empirical results, we provide explanations for the observed stability in the post-1992
period.
2.4.1 Taylor Rules without IIS
Table 2.3 presents the estimates of the models without IIS, known as M1, for the 1992Q4-
2007Q4 period. The inflation coefficient φπ is found to be positive and statistically signifi-
cant only in the models whose policy horizons are from h = 1 to h = 4 or forward-looking
models. The output gap coefficient is positive and significant regardless of the type of policy
rule. Based on the Schwarz criterion (SC), we find that the worst fitting model is the one
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responding to the past inflation rate. On the other hand, forward-looking rules dominate the
others in terms of fitness. Especially, the forward-looking interest rate rule with 3-quarter-
ahead expected inflation, Etπt+3, seems to describe best the evolution of interest rate. The
standard error (SEE) and the residual sum of squares (RSS) also suggest similar results.
Table 2.3 Taylor Rule Estimates without IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, HP Output gap
h =−1 h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Constant c 0.92* 0.75* 0.66** 0.62** 0.60** 0.63*
[0.25] [0.25] [0.25] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24]
Smoothing ρ 0.81* 0.80* 0.81* 0.80* 0.80* 0.79*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Inflation φπ -0.002 0.09 0.12* 0.14* 0.17* 0.17*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Output Gap φx 0.24* 0.21* 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 0.19*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ -0.01 0.44 0.60** 0.71* 0.81* 0.82*
[0.28] [0.25] [0.25] [0.26] [0.27] [0.27]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 1.30* 1.05* 0.98* 0.96* 0.94* 0.93*
[0.35] [0.28] [0.27] [0.25] [0.24] [0.23]
Ad j.R2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91
SEE 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
RSS 5.27 4.97 4.67 4.47 4.29 4.33
LL -12.17 -10.44 -8.52 -7.24 -5.97 -6.29
SC 0.68 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.48
AR (Far) 4.67* 4.39* 3.71* 3.42** 3.16** 3.19**
ARCH (Farch) 1.06 1.36 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.87
Normality (χ2(2)) 0.39 1.16 4.54 5.08 5.42 6.06**
Hetero (Fhet) 2.39** 1.68 0.82 0.69 0.75 0.97
Notes: The regression equation is
M1 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+ εt ,
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2007Q4, h =−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q =−1. LR: long run, SEE: standard error of the
regression, RSS: residual sum of squares, LL: log-likelihood, and SC: Schwarz criterion. The columns
correspond to different values of h. Standard errors are given in [.]. *p < 0.01 and **p < 0.05. The
autocorrelation test is the F-test suggested by Harvey (1990), normality test of Doornik and Hansen (2008),
unconditional homoscedasticity test of White (1980) and ARCH (Autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity) test of Engle et al. (1985).
The long-run responses of interest rate to inflation in all models are below unity, there-
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Table 2.4 Taylor Rule Estimates with IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, HP Output gap
h =−1 h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Constant c 0.97* 0.74* 0.41** 0.37** 0.36** 0.38**
[0.18] [0.19] [0.17] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17]
Smoothing ρ 0.75* 0.77* 0.82* 0.82* 0.82* 0.81*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Inflation φπ 0.08** 0.13* 0.19* 0.21* 0.23* 0.24*
[0.04] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
Output Gap φx 0.22* 0.19* 0.15* 0.16* 0.16* 0.16*
[0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ 0.34** 0.58* 1.03* 1.16* 1.24* 1.27*
[0.14] [0.16] [0.23] [0.26] [0.26] [0.26]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 0.88* 0.83** 0.84* 0.86* 0.87* 0.86*
[0.15] [0.16] [0.18] [0.19] [0.18] [0.18])
Ad j.R2 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
SEE 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19
RSS 1.91 1.86 1.69 1.96 1.84 1.87
LL 18.35 19.03 21.90 17.46 19.48 18.97
SC 0.34 0.25 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.05
AR (Far) 2.53 3.51* 1.37 0.76 0.80 0.55
ARCH (Farch) 1.67 1.55 0.77 1.08 0.47 0.53
Normality (χ2(2)) 0.46 0.61 0.70 1.79 0.36 0.06
Hetero (Fhet) 1.69 1.67 0.71 0.24 0.57 0.54
NIIS 10 9 8 6 6 6
Notes: The regression equation is
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt ,
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2007Q4, h =−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q =−1. NIIS: numbers of IIS retained. See footnotes in
Table 2.3 for more explanations.
fore not satisfying the Taylor principle. Although such a result is quite different from the one
documented in Nelson (2000), it is not unprecedented in the context of real-time data. For
instance, Mihailov (2006) obtains a corresponding value of 0.81 for the 1992Q4−1997Q1
period and 0.5 for the 1997Q2− 2001Q4 period. However, the mis-specification tests in
Table 2.3 reject the validity of the models without IIS. In the following part, we argue that
the results obtained from the M1-type models are likely misled by outliers and, thus, do not
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reflect properly the properties of U.K. monetary policy under inflation targeting.
2.4.2 Taylor Rules with IIS
To obtain the results which are robust to outliers, we estimate the Taylor rules with impulse
indicators for the same sample, 1992Q4−2007Q4, and present the results in Table 2.4. We
again find that forward-looking rules fit the data better than the other rules based on the
value of SC. Unlike the previous case without IIS, forward-looking rules with IIS pass all
mis-specification tests. More importantly, the responses to inflation in these rules satisfy
the Taylor principle. All estimated coefficients are also statistically significant regardless
of policy horizons. It appears that the three-period-ahead forward-looking rule is the best
explaining model of interest rate, which is similar to the previous case. In this rule, the
interest rate increases by 1.24 and 0.87 for an unexpected increase by 1 percent in inflation
and the output gap, respectively.
By comparing M2 with M1 for every corresponding pair of h, we see that SC favors M2 to
M1, therefore, suggesting that M2 fits the data better. More importantly, the above analysis
shows that the interpretation of historical policy decisions can be misleading because of not
taking outliers into consideration.
2.4.3 Quadratic Output Gap
As a robustness check, we replace the HP output gap by the quadratic gap and re-estimate
the models with and without IIS. Table 2.5 presents the results from the models without IIS
(M1). The long-run responses of interest rate to inflation are again below unity. However,
diagnostic tests reject the validity of these models.
We re-estimate the reaction functions but embed them with IIS (M2). The results in
Table 2.6 show that forward-looking rules capture the dynamics of interest rate better than
backward- and contemporaneous-looking rules. Moreover, in the best fitting rule, which is
the forward-looking rule with four-quarter-ahead expected inflation, the long-run response
to inflation is 1.24 which is similar to the estimate with IIS using the HP output gap. Mean-
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Table 2.5 Taylor Rule Estimates without IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, Quadratic Output gap
h =−1 h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Constant c 1.26* 1.03* 0.88* 0.83** 0.80** 0.80**
[0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] [0.34]
Smoothing ρ 0.75* 0.74* 0.76* 0.77* 0.76* 0.77*
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Inflation φπ 0.02 0.11** 0.13* 0.15* 0.17* 0.17*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] (0.05) [0.05] [0.06]
Output Gap φx 0.09* 0.08* 0.07* 0.07* 0.06* 0.06**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ 0.07 0.43** 0.56** 0.63** 0.72** 0.72**
[0.21] [0.21] [0.24] [0.26] [0.28] [0.31]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 0.36* 0.31* 0.29* 0.28* 0.27* 0.26*
[0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
Ad j.R2 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
SEE 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30
RSS 5.86 5.40 5.10 4.98 4.87 5.07
LL -15.37 -12.88 -11.17 -10.49 -9.82 -11.03
SC 0.79 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.64
AR (Far) 7.47* 6.34* 5.23* 5.16* 5.10* 5.61*
ARCH (Farch) 1.76 1.21 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.67
Normality (χ2(2)) 6.83** 4.77 7.15** 6.91** 7.39** 7.91**
Hetero (Fhet) 1.38 1.23 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.88
Notes: The regression equation:
M1 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+ εt
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2007Q3, h=−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q=−1. See footnotes in Table 2.3 for more explanations.
while, the long-run output coefficient is equal to 0.20. The models with IIS are also shown
to fit the data better than those without IIS. The results confirm the importance of dealing
with outliers when studying historical policy decisions.
In summary, our findings are robust to different measures of real activity. Comparing the
two best-fitting rules: one with the HP output gap and the other with the quadratic output
gap, it appears that the former captures the movement of interest rate slightly better than the
latter in terms of SC.4 We therefore use the model with the HP output gap in the following
4The model with HP output gap also retains fewer number of indicators, which implies that its explanatory
variables can explain more the evolution of interest rate than those in the other model.
2.4 Results 18
Table 2.6 Taylor Rule Estimates with IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, Quadratic Output gap
h =−1 h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Constant c 1.17* 0.89* 0.78* 0.49** 0.44 0.42
[0.27] [0.28] [0.27] [0.23] [0.22] [0.22]
Smoothing ρ 0.78* 0.79* 0.79* 0.82* 0.82* 0.82*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Inflation φπ -0.003 0.09** 0.13* 0.19* 0.21* 0.22*
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Output Gap φx 0.09* 0.08* 0.07* 0.05* 0.05* 0.04**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ -0.02 0.41 0.63* 1.04* 1.17* 1.24*
[0.20] [0.22] [0.23] [0.30] [0.32] [0.35]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 0.43* 0.38* 0.32* 0.27* 0.26* 0.20*
[0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07]
Ad j.R2 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97
SEE 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.17
RSS 3.58 3.76 3.11 1.81 1.69 1.40
LL -0.56 -2.04 3.66 19.89 22.01 27.59
SC 0.50 0.48 0.36 0.16 0.09 0.04
AR (Far) 3.65** 3.70** 3.21** 0.43 0.45 1.26
ARCH (Farch) 0.27 1.17 1.69 0.57 0.45 1.07
Normality (χ2(2)) 1.98 0.51 0.05 1.80 1.46 1.93
Hetero (Fhet) 0.64 0.86 1.59 1.75 2.13 1.05
NIIS 3 2 3 8 8 10
Notes: The regression equation:
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2012Q1, h=−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q=−1. See footnotes in Table 2.4 for more explanations.
analysis.
2.4.4 Monetary Policy after the Operational Independence in 1997
The operational independence was granted to the Bank of England in May 1997. In this
context, it is interesting to investigate if monetary policy was different between the pre- and
post-1997 periods. To address this question, we conduct two exercises. First, we divide
the sample 1992Q4-2007Q4 into two sub-samples 1992Q4-1997Q2 and 1997Q3-2007Q4,
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estimate each sub-sample and then compare their results. Second, we employ the recursive
estimation to the 1992Q4-2007Q4 sample.
Table 2.7 Taylor Rule Estimates with IIS for Sub-Samples
1993Q1−1997Q2 1997Q3−2007Q4
Constant c 1.13** 0.24
[0.48] [0.31]
Smoothing ρ 0.68* 0.85*
[0.08] [0.04]
Inflation φπ 0.23* 0.22*
[0.07] [0.06]
Output Gap φx 0.15** 0.14
[0.05] [0.12]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ 0.70** 1.43**
[0.26] [0.62]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 0.49** 0.91
[0.22] [0.67]
Ad j.R2 0.88 0.96
SEE 0.19 0.21
RSS 0.45 1.54
LL 7.75 9.89
SC -0.06 0.24
AR (Far) 0.55 0.46
ARCH (Farch) 1.14 0.69
Normality (χ2(2)) 0.47 0.84
Hetero (Fhet) 0.87 1.34
NIIS 1 4
Notes: The regression equation:
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt
for h = 3 and q =−1. See footnotes in Table 2.4 for more explanations.
Table 2.7 presents the results of the first exercise. Interestingly, the short-run responses
of interest rate to inflation and the output gap are similar between the two sub-samples:
0.22 and 0.15, respectively. However, the smoothing parameter increases to 0.85 after the
operational independence from 0.68 in the pre-independence. Consequently, the long-run
responses to inflation and the output gap rise in the post-independence. For an increase by
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1 percent in inflation, the long-run response of interest rate increased from only 0.7 percent
in the pre-1997Q2 period to 1.43 percent after that. The long-run response to the output gap
also doubles, but not statistically significant in the post-1997Q2 sub-sample.
Regarding the second exercise, Figure 2.1 plots the recursive estimate of the short-run
inflation coefficient with the 1992Q4-1995Q2 sample used for the initial estimation. It ap-
pears that the response to inflation increased consistently from 0.13 in 1995Q3 to 0.28 in
1997Q3, then stayed stable around that level for a relatively long period to the mid-2000s
before declining slightly. On the contrary, the short-run output gap coefficient reduced from
0.2 in 1995Q3 to 0.13 in 1997Q3 and remained stable at that level (Figure 2.2). Regarding
the smoothing coefficient, it fell to the lowest level of 0.68 in 1997Q3 from 0.78 in 1995Q3,
but went up gradually to 0.81 in 2007Q4 (Figure 2.3). It is more intuitive to look at the
long-run responses to inflation and the output gap which are presented in Figure 2.4. The
former has been above unity since 1997Q4, a few months after the operational indepen-
dence, and stayed around 1.2 until the end of the sample. Meanwhile, the long-run output
gap coefficient declined from 1.0 in 1995Q3 to 0.35 in 2000Q1, but went up continually to
0.9 by 2007Q4.
Based on these results, it is fair to say that monetary policy has responded stronger
to inflation since the granting of operational independence to the Bank of England. This
finding is in line with Adam et al. (2005).
2.4.5 Estimation Including the Recent Crisis Period
In the previous analysis we exclude the recent crisis period, the post-2007 sample, in order
to highlight the important characteristics of U.K. monetary policy under inflation targeting.
In this section, we examine the effects of taking this period into account. Table 2.8 presents
the estimates using the 1992Q4-2012Q1 sample. As it is shown, most of quarters in the
post-2007 sample are detected as outliers. Specifically, among 14 indicators retained, there
are 11 indicators belong to the 2007Q4-2012Q1 period.
The model performs well and passes all mis-specification tests. All estimates are statis-
tically significant in both the short run and long run. Most importantly, the results affirm that
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the long-run response to inflation is above unity, thus satisfying the Taylor principle. This
finding therefore corroborates our belief in the method applied and the results obtained.
Table 2.8 Taylor Rule Estimates with IIS for the 1993-2012 Period
Constant c 0.19**
[0.14]
Smoothing ρ 0.88*
[0.03]
Inflation φπ 0.16*
[0.03]
Output Gap φx 0.17*
[0.03]
LR-Inflation γπ = φπ1−ρ 1.33*
[0.36]
LR-Output Gap γx = φπ1−ρ 1.39*
[0.20]
Ad j.R2 0.99
SEE 0.22
RSS 2.84
LL 17.82
SC 0.55
AR (Far) 1.33
ARCH (Farch) 0.47
Normality (χ2(2)) 0.62
Hetero (Fhet) 0.54
NIIS 14
1998Q4, 1999Q3-Q4,2007Q4
2008Q1,2008Q3-Q4,2009Q2
2010Q4,2011Q1-Q4, 2012Q1
Notes: The regression equation:
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2012Q1, h = 3, and q =−1. See footnotes in Table 2.4 for more explanations.
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2.4.6 Stability of the Post-1992 Inflation - An Empirical Evaluation
We discuss some possible explanations for the stability of the post-1992 inflation. First,
according to Clarida et al. (1998), the magnitude of the long-run inflation parameter γπ is key
to evaluate a central bank’s policy rule. If γπ > 1, when inflation rises, the real interest rate
increases, thus slowing the economy and reducing inflationary pressures. On the contrary,
with γπ < 1, though the central bank raises the nominal rate to respond to an unexpected
rise in inflation, it is not increased sufficiently to prevent the real rate from declining; thus
the self-fulfilling bursts of inflation and output may be possible. Consequently, an effective
policy rule should have γπ > 1. As it is regarded above, such a property is called the Taylor
principle. Clearly, the forward-looking rules with IIS satisfy this principle. Second, the
forward-looking rules appear to capture the movement of the interest rate better than the
others suggesting that the post-1992 monetary policy “leans against the wind”. This is
another important characteristic of an effective monetary policy as regarded by Taylor and
Williams (2011). Third, the smoothing parameter is found to be large and significant which
helps monetary authorities avoid the loss of credibility from sudden large policy reversals
(Clarida et al., 1998). Last but not least, the granting of instrument independence to the Bank
of England led to a stronger response to inflation which likely reflects the determination to
anchor inflation expectations, accordingly, contributing to keep inflation stable.
2.5 Conclusion
The study analyzed U.K. monetary policy under inflation targeting based on a real-time
Taylor-rule framework. It considered a wide range of rules including backward, contempo-
raneous, and forward-looking policy functions in order to address what rule describes best
the post-1992 conduct of monetary policy. Some important results were established. First,
we show the importance of dealing with outliers. Failing to do so misleads the features of
U.K. monetary policy under inflation targeting. Second, the robust characteristics of mon-
etary policy during this regime are forward-looking and rising the interest rate more than
unity to movements in inflation. Third, monetary policy apparently responds stronger to
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inflation after the operational independence. Based on these features of monetary policy,
the documented price stability under inflation targeting could be explained. Nonetheless,
the current study did not take into account some other issues such as the contemporane-
ous or forward-looking behavior of interest rate to the output gap or the role of asymmetric
preferences in policymaking. We hope to solve these shortcomings in future investigations.
Chapter 3
Modeling Changes in U.S. Monetary
Policy
3.1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Clarida et al. (2000) show that U.S. monetary policy has been subject to
important changes in the postwar period. Specifically, the authors find that the pre-Volcker
monetary policy was greatly accommodative with the interest rate being raised less than the
increase in expected inflation, perhaps not satisfying the Taylor principle. The basic logic
behind this principle is that when inflation increases, monetary policy needs to raise the
real interest rate in order to slow the economy and reduce inflationary pressures (Taylor and
Williams, 2011). On the contrary, during the Volcker-Greenspan era, the anti-inflationary
stance of monetary policy was strong with an increase in expected inflation being associated
with a larger increase in the nominal interest rate.
The Clarida-Galí-Gertler results have been criticized in four main dimensions. The first
dimension is that a single break may not be a proper characterization of the evolution of
monetary policy. Boivin (2006) estimates a policy rule with time-varying parameters and
finds that the response to inflation was strong until the mid-1970s, became weak in the
remainder of the 1970s, and then rebounded to be strong in the early 1980s. Cogley and
Sargent (2005, 2001) obtain similar results.
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Regarding the second dimension, there have been arguments that it might not be mone-
tary policy but luck that changed between the pre- and post-Volcker periods. Sims and Zha
(2006), for instance, examine several multivariate regime-switching models for the U.S.
economy and show that the best fit is the one allowing time variation in disturbance vari-
ances only. The authors reckon that the observed changes of monetary policy before and
after 1979 can be attributed to the presence of heteroscedasticity.
The third dimension is about the type of data used: real-time data, i.e. the data available
to policymakers when making decisions, versus ex-post data. Orphanides (2001) argues
that using the latter misleads the properties of the historical conduct of monetary policy.
Orphanides (2002) estimates forward-looking Taylor rules, similar to those considered by
Clarida et al. (2000), with real-time data on inflation and unemployment and finds that
monetary policy during the 1970s was essentially similar with the period after that.
Finally, a number of studies have argued that monetary policy may respond asymmet-
rically to changes in the state of the economy due to asymmetric preferences of the central
bank with respect to inflation and/or real activity (see, e.g., Cukierman and Gerlach, 2003;
Nobay and Peel, 2003; Ruge-Murcia, 2003). Notably, Dolado et al. (2004) show that the
conduct of monetary policy in the Volcker-Greenspan regime could be characterized by an
asymmetric rule that induced deflationary bias. However, this does not hold for the Burns-
Miller regime. Contrary to Clarida et al. (2000), the authors do not find evidence that the
response of interest rate to inflation in the post-Volcker period was larger than unity.
The above studies highlight four issues that are apparently crucial in evaluating the evo-
lution of U.S. monetary policy: (i) the type of time-variation in policy parameters, (ii) the
treatment of heteroscedasticity, (iii) the real-time nature of data, and (iv) the role of asym-
metric preferences. This work, for the first time in the literature, takes all these issues
simultaneously into account. To do so, we first derive a model specification as the discre-
tionary outcome of the formal monetary policy design problem in which the central bank
displays asymmetric preferences. The coefficients of the derived policy rule are allowed to
vary over time, as in Boivin (2006) and Kim and Nelson (2006), in order to capture poten-
tial changes in policy parameters. Moreover, we deal with heteroscedasticity by assuming
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the standard deviation of monetary policy innovations to follow stochastic volatility pro-
cesses similar to Stock and Watson (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Finally,
following Orphanides (2001), we use real-time Greenbook forecasts for estimation. The
resulting econometric model is both time-varying and nonlinear with respect to parameters.
Therefore, the popular Kalman filter can not be utilized. To overcome this issue, we ap-
ply a novel approach, which has gained popularity in economics and econometrics recently,
called particle filtering (see, Creal, 2012; Doucet et al., 2001; Gordon et al., 1993).
Our findings suggest substantial changes in the response to inflation and real activity as
well as in the Fed’s preferences. Regarding the pre-Volcker period, the response to inflation
was not uniformly weak as typically assumed. It violated the Taylor principle only in the
second half of the 1970s, but not before that. This result is in line with Cogley and Sargent
(2005, 2001) and Boivin (2006). Moreover, we find that the pre-Volcker monetary policy
behaved as if possessing asymmetric preferences that could have caused inflationary bias in
the conduct of monetary policy. This evidence could help explain the great inflation during
this decade.
On the other hand, monetary policy in the post-Volcker era appears to have responded
symmetrically to inflation and real activity, thus less likely creating the type of inflationary
bias as before. Surico (2007) investigates changes in the Fed’s preferences before and after
1979 and obtains similar results. Nonetheless, a single-regime symmetric policy rule is not a
proper characterization for the post-Volcker monetary policy because there are considerable
differences in the response of interest rate to inflation and real activity between the 1980s
and the 1990s and thereafter period. In the former, monetary policy responded strongly to
inflation but weakly to real activity, as in line with Kim and Nelson (2006) and Clarida et al.
(2000), which implies a concentration of the Fed on stabilizing inflation. In contrast, once
inflation has been stabilized, the Fed has paid more attention to stabilizing real activity,
while hardly responding to inflation, since the early 1990s, which is broadly similar to
Martin and Milas (2010) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010b, 2015) in terms of the
response to inflation and Kim and Nelson (2006) and Blinder and Reis (2005) in terms of
the response to real activity. Overall, our findings suggest that the conduct of U.S. monetary
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policy could have experienced important changes at the mid and late 1970s, and the early
1990s.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the formal monetary policy de-
sign problem in which the central bank’s loss function is asymmetric with respect to infla-
tion. Section 3.3 describes the empirical model with time-varying parameters and stochastic
volatility. The same section deals with how to apply particle filtering to estimate the model.
Section 3.4 presents the data, the empirical results, a number of robustness checks, and a
discussion on the evolution of monetary policy through the lens of our model. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 The Theoretical Model
The central bank chooses the interest rate to minimize the present discounted value of its
asymmetric loss function. This policy action is subject to the constraints imposed by the
structure of the economy, which includes two components: the forward-looking Phillips
curve and the IS curve.
3.2.1 The Loss Function
The loss function L(·) of the central bank is assumed to depend on the inflation gap, which
is the difference between inflation and its target πt − π∗, the output gap yt , which is the
gap between the actual output and the potential one, and the interest rate gap, which is the
distance between the interest rate level and the target it− i∗ (Surico, 2007; Tillmann, 2011).
Formally, the loss function takes the following form
Lt =
eα(πt−π∗)−α(πt −π∗)−1
α2
+
µ
2
(yt)2+
γ
2
(it − i∗)2, (3.1)
where α captures the asymmetry in the loss function with respect to inflation, µ and γ
are parameters representing the central bank’s preferences towards the output gap and the
deviation of the interest rate from its target. The preference to inflation is normalized to
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one. This specification of the loss function is called the linex function proposed by Varian
(1975) and introduced to the optimal monetary policy literature by Nobay and Peel (2003).
The loss function (3.1) differs from the conventional quadratic set-up in the way it deals
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Fig. 3.1 Preference over Inflation Stabilization
with inflation deviations. For α > 0, when inflation is above the target, the exponential
term of the loss function eα(πt−π∗) dominates the linear term α(πt−π∗), so the value of the
loss function rises exponentially. However, if inflation is below the target, the linear term
dominates the exponential term and the value of the loss function increases linearly. This
implies that, for α > 0, positive deviations of inflation relative to the target are more costly
than negative deviations. In this case, the central bank can be said to have deflationary
bias. In contrast, for α < 0, negative deviations cause a greater loss than positive deviations.
This case reflects the view of the central bank that deflation is more costly than inflation.
Therefore, the central bank can be characterized as possessing inflationary bias. Another
interesting feature is that when α approaches zero, the loss function becomes the common
quadratic form. The quadratic loss function is thus a special case of the loss function (3.1).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the above cases.
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3.2.2 The Structure of the Economy
The structure of the economy imposes constraints to the policy action. This structure in-
cludes the following two components
πt = βEtπt+1+κyt + εst , (3.2)
yt = Etyt+1−ϕ(it −Etπt+1)+ εdt , (3.3)
which represent the equilibrium conditions of the standard New Keynesian model. The
reader is referred to Woodford (2003, Chapter 3) and Galí (2008, Chapter 3) for a complete
derivation. Equation (3.2) is called the forward-looking Phillips curve. It is built from the
Calvo-type staggered nominal price setting in which only a fraction of firms are allowed to
reset their prices in any given period, whereas the others are constrained to keep their pre-
vailing prices. When a firm has a chance to re-optimize, it chooses the price that maximizes
the present discounted value of its profits subject to constraints on the frequency of future
price changes. Because of common marginal costs, all firms that change their prices choose
the same price. Inflation thus relies entirely on current and expected future economic con-
ditions. Specifically, it relates to the current output gap and expected inflation. Regarding
the equation’s parameters, β < 1 is the discount factor and κ is the slope coefficient of the
Phillips curve.
The second equation (3.3) is the log-linearized consumption Euler equation which is de-
rived from the household’s optimal consumption decision and the market clearing condition.
This equation shows that the current output gap depends on the expected future output gap
and the real interest rate. A higher level of expected future output leads to a greater level of
current output because of the consumption smoothing behavior, whereas a higher real inter-
est rate lowers the current output owning to the intertemporal substitution of consumption.
The interest elasticity ϕ corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally,
εst and εdt are cost and demand disturbances.
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3.2.3 Asymmetric Policy Rule
Central bankers conduct monetary policy to minimize the expected value of a loss criterion
of the form
W = Et
∞
∑
i=1
β iLt+i, (3.4)
subject to the forward-looking Phillips curve (3.2) and the IS curve (3.3).
It is assumed that central bankers are unable to make any kind of commitment over the
course of future monetary policy. Instead, they take private sector expectations as given and
execute policy under discretion. According to Clarida et al. (1999), this scenario seems to
accord best with reality. Given this assumption, the Lagrangian of the policy problem is
written as follows
Min
πt ,yt ,it
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−α(πt −π∗)−1
α2
+
µ
2
(yt)2+
γ
2
(it − i∗)2
−φπt (πt −κyt − εst )−φ yt (yt +ϕit − εdt )
}
,
where φπt and φ
y
t are the Lagrange multipliers. It is straightforward to obtain the following
first-order conditions
Et(µyt +φπt κ−φ yt ) = 0,
Et [γ(it − i∗)−φ yt ϕ] = 0,
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
−φπt
}
= 0.
Using these conditions, we obtain
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
+
µ
κ
yt − γϕκ (it − i
∗)
}
= 0. (3.5)
3.3 The Empirical Model 32
Based on (3.5), the central bank sets the interest rate according to
it = i∗+Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
ϕκ
γ
+
µϕ
γ
yt
}
,
and the above expression can be approximated as
it = i∗+Et
{
(πt −π∗)ϕκγ +(πt −π
∗)2
αϕκ
2γ
+
µϕ
γ
yt
}
= i∗+
ϕκ
γ
Et(πt −π∗)+ αϕκ2γ Et(πt −π
∗)2+
µϕ
γ
Etyt .
(3.6)
The expectations operator in (3.6) implies that the policy action is taken before the realiza-
tion of inflation and the output gap. Therefore, the central bank chooses the interest rate
at time t based on its expectations on the relevant variables conditional on the information
available at that period. Let πt|t , σ2πt |t , yt|t be the nowcasts of inflation, the variance of
inflation, and the output gap, respectively. Equation (3.6) can be re-written as
it = a0+a1πt|t +a2σ2πt |t +a3yt|t . (3.7)
where a0 = i∗− ϕκγ π∗, a1 = ϕκγ , a2 = αϕκ2γ , and a3 = µϕγ . Note that when α approaches
zero, so does a2, the reaction function (3.7) collapses to a standard interest rate rule in
which the interest rate responds symmetrically to the deviations of inflation and output from
their targets. Equation (3.7) therefore nests the symmetric form as a special case. In the next
section, we describe how to fit (3.7) to data.
3.3 The Empirical Model
The empirical counterpart of the theoretical model (3.7) is written as follows
it = ρt it−1+(1−ρt)(a0,t +a1,tπt|t +a2,tσ2πt |t +a3,tyt|t)+ exp(a4,t)εt , (3.8)
ρt =
1
1+ exp(−a5,t) , (3.9)
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ak,t = ak,t−1+ exp(σak)εak,t , k = 0,1, ...,5, (3.10)
where εt ∼ i.i.d.N(0,1) and εak,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0,1) for k = 0,1, ...,5. The innovations, εt and
εak,t for k = 0,1, ...,5, are independent.
This empirical model deals with the four issues raised in the literature on modeling
monetary policy. First, its specification takes into consideration the asymmetric issue in
monetary policy. Second, parameters are allowed to vary over time to capture potential
changes in the conduct of monetary policy. Third, the issue of heteroscedasticity is treated
by modeling the standard deviation of monetary policy innovations by a stochastic volatility
process. Finally, the model is fitted with real-time data, as will be discussed below. It is also
worth noting other features of the model. Following Clarida et al. (1999), the lag of interest
rate is included as an explanatory variable to capture the observed smoothing of interest rate.
Moreover, the smoothing parameter ρt is constrained to be positive but smaller than unity
and then transformed to the real line by the logit transformation as in line with Kim and
Nelson (2006). For the time-variation of parameters, it is assumed to follow random walk
dynamics similar to Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Boivin (2006), among many others.
Substituting (3.9) into (3.8) yields
it =
1
1+ exp(−a5,t) it−1+
exp(−a5,t)
1+ exp(−a5,t)(a0,t +a1,tπt|t +a2,tσ
2
πt |t +a3,tyt|t)
+exp(a4,t)εt ,
(3.11)
The combination of (3.10) and (3.11) generates a state-space system. In this system, the state
model (3.10) describes the evolution of the state vector xt = [a0,t ,a1,t ,a2,t ,a3,t ,a4,t ,a5,t ]′ and
the measurement model (3.11) relates the noisy measurement it to the state. In order to
facilitate the analysis, the state-space system is written in its probabilistic form as follows
xt = h(xt−1,wt ;ϖ), (3.12)
it = g(xt ,εt ;ϖ ,At), (3.13)
where wt = [ε0,t ,ε1,t ,ε2,t ,ε3,t ,ε4,t ,ε5,t ]′ is the vector of state noises, which has a multivariate
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normal distribution with zero mean and identity covariance matrix, ϖ = [σa0,σa1,σa2,σa3,
σa4,σa5]
′ presents the set of time-invariant parameters, and At = [it−1,πt|t ,yt|t ,σ2πt |t ] includes
observed inputs. To ease notation, in what follows we drop At without any loss of generality.
The functions h(·) and g(·) come from the equations that characterize the behavior of the
model, which are (3.10) and (3.11), respectively.
We aim to estimate the evolution of state variables given the sequence of received mea-
surement. In order to do so, it is required to construct the posterior probability density
function of the state vector. However, the constraint on the smoothing parameter and the
stochastic volatility of monetary policy shocks generate nonlinearities in the system, pre-
venting us from using the well-known Kalman filter and, thus, completing the estimation.
To deal with the nonlinearities, we apply the approach called the particle filter, which is
proposed by Gordon et al. (1993). The key idea of particle filtering is to represent the re-
quired posterior density function by a set of random samples with associated weights and to
compute estimates based on these samples and weights (Ristic et al., 2004).
Before we go into the details of the algorithm, let us introduce Xt = {x j, j = 0, ..., t} and
It = {i j, j = 0, ..., t} which represent the sequences of all states and available measurements,
respectively, up to time t. The joint posterior density at time t is denoted by p(Xt |It) and
its marginal is p(xt |It). Let {Xkt ,ωkt }Nk=1 denote a random measure that describes the joint
posterior p(Xt |It) where {Xkt ,k = 1, ...,N} is a set of support points with associated weights
{ωkt ,k = 1, ...,N}. The weights are normalized by dividing each by their sum. Thus, the
joint posterior distribution at t can be approximated by
p(Xt |It)≈
N
∑
k=1
ωkt δ (Xt −Xkt ), (3.14)
where δ (.) is the Dirac delta measure. The normalized weights ωkt are chosen by applying
the principle of importance sampling in which Xkt is drawn from an importance density
q(Xt |It)
ωkt ∝
p(Xkt |It)
q(Xkt |It)
. (3.15)
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If the importance density is chosen so that it can be factorized by
q(Xt |It), q(xt |Xt−1, It)q(Xt−1|It−1), (3.16)
then the samples Xkt ∼ q(Xt |It) can be achieved by augmenting each of the existing samples
Xkt−1 ∼ q(Xt−1|It−1) with the new state xkt ∼ q(xt |Xk−1, Ik). At time step t when a measure-
ment it becomes available, the posterior density p(Xt |It) can be updated from p(Xt−1|It−1)
by
p(Xt |It) = p(it |Xt , It−1)p(Xt |It−1)p(it |It−1)
=
p(it |Xt , It−1)p(xt |Xt−1, It−1)p(Xt−1|It−1)
p(it |It−1)
=
p(it |xt)p(xt |xt−1)p(Xt−1|It−1)
p(it |It−1)
∝ p(it |xt)p(xt |xt−1)p(Xt−1|It−1). (3.17)
Substituting (3.16) and (3.17) into (3.15) yields the weight update equation
ωkt ∝
p(it |xkt )p(xkt |xkt−1)p(Xkt−1|It−1)
q(xkt |Xkt−1, It)q(Xkt−1|It−1)
= ωkt−1
p(it |xkt )p(xkt |xkt−1)
q(xkt |Xkt−1, It)
.
Moreover, by choosing the importance density to depend only on xt−1 and it , the weights
are given by
ωkt ∝ ω
k
t−1
p(it |xkt )p(xkt |xkt−1)
q(xkt |xkt−1, it)
.
In this study, we use the bootstrap filtering proposed by Gordon et al. (1993) in which
q(xt |xt−1,zt) = p(xt |xt−1). Therefore,
ωkt ∝ ω
k
t−1 p(it |xkt ).
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Given these weights, the marginal posterior density p(xt |It) can be approximated as
p(xt |It)≈
N
∑
k=1
ωkt δ (xt −xkt−1). (3.18)
As N → ∞ the approximation (3.18) approaches the true marginal posterior density p(xt |It)
(Ristic et al., 2004). Based on this posterior density, we estimate the state vector as its
conditional mean.
It is however worth emphasizing that, given the importance function of the form (3.16),
the variance of importance weights can only increase over time, thus leading to the degen-
eracy problem (Ristic et al., 2004). Therefore, resampling that replaces the samples with
low importance weights by those with high importance weights is required. There are many
different resampling schemes, which can be referred to Doucet and Johansen (2009), but
we use the systematic resampling method because it is easy to apply and outperforms other
resampling schemes in most cases (Doucet and Johansen, 2009).
Moreover, a by-product of the particle filter is that the likelihood can be approximated
by using the weights ω it
p(IT ;ϖ)≈
T
∏
i=1
(
N
∑
i=1
ω it
)
. (3.19)
Appendix B.1 presents the details of this approximation. Once the likelihood is evaluated,
we can use the maximum likelihood approach to estimate ϖ , the vector of time-invariant
parameters.
Note that particle filtering generates an approximation to the likelihood function that is
not differentiable with respect to the parameters because of the inherent discreteness of the
resampling step. Therefore, Newton’s type algorithms, based on derivatives, are not ap-
plicable. Nguyen (2015) and van Binsbergen et al. (2012) deal with this issue by using the
covariance matrix adaption evolutionary strategy (CMA-ES) because this optimization algo-
rithm is designed to cope with objective functions that are non-linear, non-convex, rugged,
multimodal as well as with those having other difficult conditions (Hansen, 2011). Follow-
ing these papers, we employ the CMA-ES to obtain the maximum-likelihood estimates of
ϖ .
3.4 Data and Empirical Results 37
3.4 Data and Empirical Results
3.4.1 Data
The estimation of state-space system described by (3.10) and (3.11) require data for the
nominal interest rate, expected inflation, the expected variance of inflation, and the ex-
pected output gap. For the nominal interest rate it , we use the effective federal funds rate
extracted from the FRED economic data. For the expected value of inflation πt|t , we use
the Greenbook forecasts of the current-quarter annualized percentage change in the GNP
or GDP deflator. The expected variance of inflation σ2πt |t is not available, we discuss the
construction of this series in Section 3.4.2. For the expected output gap yt|t , we proxy it by
the unemployment gap for two reasons. First, because of repeated changes in the base year,
no consistent time series of predicted real GDP or GNP can be derived from the Greenbook
over the sample (Boivin, 2006). Second, maximum employment is one of the objectives of
monetary policy clearly written in the Federal Act, thus the unemployment rate should be
taken directly into the policy function. We define the unemployment gap as the difference
between the natural rate of unemployment and the forecasted unemployment rate, therefore
the sign of the unemployment gap is consistent with that of the conventionally-defined out-
put gap. While the forecast of contemporaneous unemployment rate is collected directly
from the Greenbook, the natural rate of unemployment is measured by a 5-year moving
average of unemployment rate as in Bernanke and Boivin (2003). We name this proxy
the 5-year moving average unemployment gap. Because of uncertainties in the real-time
measures of real activity, we investigate the robustness of the baseline results to different
measures of real activity, including the expected output gap per se.
The sample of the above data is from 1965Q4 to 2007Q4. The starting point coincides
with the first period that predictions were recorded in the Greenbook, while the ending point
is the latest period available. Note that the Greenbook forecasts are made publicly available
with a 5-year lag. We also use monthly data of inflation and unemployment from 1948M1 to
2007M9 for the constructions of the expected variance of inflation and the expected variance
of output gap, which we describe next.
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3.4.2 Expected Variance of Inflation
Bollerslev (1986) and Dolado et al. (2004) obtain the conditional variance of inflation with
ex-post revised data by estimating inflation dynamics using a GARCH(1,1) model. Because
of the real-time data issue, i.e. inflation at time t can be only observed with a lag, we
modify this GARCH procedure in two ways. First, we estimate a specification of inflation
dynamics with GARCH(1,1) errors using information available at that time. Second, based
on the estimated GARCH process, we forecast the contemporaneous variance of inflation.
This procedure is conducted recursively from 1965Q4 to 2007Q4.
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Fig. 3.2 Expected Variance of Inflation
Notes: The expected variance of inflation is computed by applying the four-step procedure described in
Section 3.4.2, with the number of lags of inflation set equal to three and the output gap yt proxied by the
five-year moving average gap in Equation (3.20).
We use the following specification of inflation dynamics
πt = c+
n
∑
i=1
βiπt−i+ζyt + εt , (3.20)
εt = σπ,tzt , (3.21)
σ2π,t = α0+α1ε
2
t−1+β1σ
2
π,t−1. (3.22)
Equation (3.20) is derived from (3.2) by substituting Etπt+1 by a linear combination of the
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lags of inflation. According to Rudebusch (2001), Equation (3.20) is fairly successful in
capturing the dynamics of inflation in the U.S. economy. This specification is also similar
to the one used in Bollerslev (1986) and Dolado et al. (2004).
As mentioned above, we proxy yt by the unemployment gap. Because data on inflation
and unemployment are available at the monthly frequency, we utilize this advantage to in-
crease the number of observations, which most likely benefits GARCH-based estimations.
We assume that the variance of inflation of quarter t is nowcasted using the information
available at the first month of that quarter. This assumption is in line with the Greenbook
forecasts because they are often published by the end of the first month or the middle of the
second month of a quarter.
We detail the procedure to forecast the contemporaneous variance of inflation series as
follows:
Step 0, Initiation: We start with the 1965Q4 period, set i 1965Q4.
Step 1, Estimation: Let Ii be the information set at time i which includes monthly inflation
and the output gap (proxied by the unemployment gap) from 1948M1 to the last month
of the quarter i−1. Given Ii, Equation (3.20) is estimated with GARCH(1,1) errors.
Step 2, Forecast: Based on the estimated-GARCH process, we forecast the conditional
variances of inflation for the three months of quarter i. Take the average of those
forecasts and save it as σ2πi|Ii .
Step 3, Termination: If i ̸= 2007Q4, move to the next period i = i+ 1 and follow step 1.
Otherwise, the procedure stops and we collect the expected variance of inflation σ2πi|Ii
for i = 1965Q4, ...,2007Q4.
Figure 3.2 present one of the measures of the expected variance of inflation estimated
by applying the above four-step procedure with three lags of inflation (n= 3) and the output
gap (yt) proxied by the 5-year moving average unemployment gap. Overall, we observe that
the expected variance of inflation has changed considerably over time. Specifically, it was
around 0.05 in the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, then increased substantially in
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Forecasts of Inflation Variance: 1965Q4-2007Q4
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Means 0.102 0.100 0.104 0.102 0.099 0.098
Standard deviations 0.055 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.051 0.052
Correlation matrix
M0 1.000 0.994 0.993 0.991 0.992 0.988
M1 0.994 1.000 0.984 0.995 0.987 0.995
M2 0.993 0.985 1.000 0.993 0.978 0.973
M3 0.991 0.995 0.993 1.00 0.978 0.984
M4 0.992 0.987 0.978 0.978 1.000 0.994
M5 0.988 0.995 0.973 0.984 0.994 1.000
Notes: The table reports the means, the standard deviations and the correlation matrix of different estimates
of the expected variance of inflation by applying the four-step procedure outlined in Section 3.4.2. The
measures are different in terms of the number of lags of inflation (n) and the measure of output gap (yt ) used
in Equation (3.20). The measure M0 is associated with three lags of inflation n = 3 and the output gap yt
proxied by the five-year moving average unemployment gap. For M1, n = 6 and yt proxied by the five-year
moving average unemployment gap. For M2, n = 3 and yt proxied by the historical average unemployment
gap. For M3, n = 6 and yt proxied by the historical average unemployment gap. For M4, n = 3 and yt proxied
by the three-year moving average unemployment gap. Finally, for M5, n = 6 and yt proxied by the three-year
moving average unemployment gap.
the mid-1970s. It reduced gradually to the level of 0.05 by 2000s, but rose again after that
and reached a peak in 2007Q1.
We also consider alternative proxies of the output gap and different numbers of lags of
inflation used in Equation (3.20) and summarize all the results in Table 3.1. As it can be
seen, these forecasts are very similar, thus corroborating our constructed series.1 For the
estimation of the baseline model, we use the measure depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.4.3 Results for the Baseline Model
We proceed to analyze the estimation results, with a particular interest in the responses
of interest rate to real activity, inflation, and the variance of inflation.2 Figure 3.3 reports
the response to real activity. We observe that the response was positive and statistically
1The results remain similar if we substitute the real activity variable yt in (3.20) by a linear combination of
its lags.
2The estimates of time-invariant parameters are presented in Appendix B.2.
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significant in the 1970s in line with Clarida et al. (2000). In the 1980s, it decreased and
became insignificant, particularly in the second half of the decade. In the early 1990s, the
response to real activity experienced a substantial increase from just above 1.0 in 1990 to
approximately 2.0 from 1995 onwards, which implies that the Fed paid more attention to
real activity since then. This result is in line with Blinder and Reis (2005) who find that
monetary policy under the Greenspan regime responded stronger to unemployment than the
policy under the Volcker period. Kim and Nelson (2006) also obtain similar results when
estimating a time-varying parameter model using ex-post data.
The response to inflation is depicted in Figure 3.4. The pre-1979 response to inflation
was not uniformly weak as typically assumed. It was above unity until 1975, then decreased
considerably and went below unity, particularly between 1976 and 1978. This property of
the pre-1979 monetary policy is surprisingly consistent with Boivin (2006) and Cogley and
Sargent (2005, 2001). Based on narrative evidence, Romer and Romer (1989) also point
out that the actual commitment of the Fed to combat inflation appeared to have been weak
in the 1976-1978 period. In 1979Q3, Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of the Fed,
the response to inflation became strong, which is in line with the findings of Clarida et al.
(2000) and Romer and Romer (1989). However, the main shift under the Volcker’s tenure
seems to have happened during the 1981-1982 period as documented by Boivin (2006). The
inflation coefficient was mainly above unity to the early 1990s, then fell and has become not
significant by the mid-1990s. This finding could be surprising given the fact that inflation
has continued staying at low and stable levels in the 1990s and thereafter. In Section 3.4.5,
we provide a discussion about this point. For the moment, we just note that the finding of
a weak response to inflation in the post-1990 period is not unprecedented in the literature.
Martin and Milas (2010) test the opportunistic approach in the U.S. and obtain a similar
result. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010b, 2015) estimate a DSGE model with drifting pa-
rameters and stochastic volatility for the U.S. economy and find that the post-1990 response
to inflation was weak.
Regarding the response to inflation variance, Figure 3.5 shows that it was negative and
statistically significant in the pre-1979 period, but not statistically different from zero in
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the post-1979 period. These results therefore suggest that the Fed in the pre-1979 period
behaved as if having asymmetric preferences in the sense that negative inflation gaps are
considered to be more costly than positive gaps of the same absolute size. In other words,
deflation was thought to be more costly than inflation. Meanwhile, the post-1979 monetary
policy could be characterized by symmetric rules. Our results are broadly similar to Surico
(2007) who investigates changes in asymmetric preferences of the Fed before and after 1979.
The smoothing parameter and the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks also
vary over the sample as displayed in Figure 3.6. Regarding the former, it was large and stable
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, which suggests that the interest rate was persistent
during these periods. The smoothing parameter then decreased and reached the bottom in
the early 2000s, before returning to the high level of persistence at the end of the sample.
Concerning the standard deviation of monetary policy shocks, it has become lower and
more stable since the mid-1980s. This result therefore affirms the importance of taking
heteroscedasticity into account as emphasized by Sims and Zha (2006).
3.4.4 Robustness Checks
We study the robustness of the results in the baseline model along two dimensions: alterna-
tive measures of real activity and another model specification with asymmetric preferences
with respect to both inflation and output gap.
Real Activity Measures
In the baseline model, we proxy the output gap by the difference between a 5-year mov-
ing average of unemployment rate and the expected contemporaneous unemployment rate.
Because there is no guarantee that this proxy corresponds to the real activity measure per-
ceived by policymakers, it is important to investigate how robust the results are with respect
to different measures of the output gap.
First, we consider two alternative measures of the natural rate of unemployment: a his-
torical average and a 3-year moving average (Boivin, 2006), leading to the two different
measures of unemployment gap. The estimates with these alternatives are presented in Fig-
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Fig. 3.6 Interest Rate Smoothing Degree and Stochastic Volatility
Note: Dashed lines are 68% and 90% percentile intervals.
ures 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. The response to inflation follows the similar path regardless
of the measure used. In terms of the response to real activity, the one with the 3-year moving
average unemployment gap was not distinguishable from zero in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the
one with the historical average unemployment gap was statistically significant over the sam-
ple; although, it was only marginally significant in the second half of the 1980s. However,
both cases affirm that the Fed has responded stronger to real activity since the early 1990s.
For the coefficient on the inflation variance, it was negative and significant in the 1970s,
then has became insignificant since the early 1980s. Overall, the results are similar to those
in the baseline model.
We have so far considered the unemployment rate as a proxy for the output gap be-
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cause, as mentioned previously, it is built from a time series that has a consistent definition
throughout the sample. Though this is not the case for real GDP- or GNP-based measures.
In this robustness check, we conduct the estimation with the output gap per se, which is the
HP output gap, and then compare the results obtained with those in the baseline model. In
order to do so, we need to construct the expected contemporaneous real-time HP output gap
series. This step is described in Appendix B.3 and the constructed series is shown in Figure
3.9 together with the above measures of unemployment gap. As can be seen in the figure,
the HP output gap series shows a similar trend with the measures based on unemployment.
We then re-estimate the state-space system in Section 3.3 using this HP output gap series
and display the results in Figure 3.10. The main finding is that the evolving path of the esti-
mated responses using the HP output gap are similar with those documented in the baseline
model. Thus, the results drawn are not sensitive to the output gap measure.
Asymmetric Preferences to Both Inflation and Output Gap
So far, we have considered asymmetric preferences with respect to inflation. However, the
central bank may also react asymmetrically to real activity, for instance, a negative output
gap may be considered more costly than a positive gap of the same absolute size. This kind
of asymmetry is studied in Ruge-Murcia (2003) and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003). For
this reason, we modify the loss function in Equation (3.1) to include a linex function of the
output gap as follows
Lt =
eα(πt−π∗)−α(πt −π∗)−1
α2
+µ(
eλyt −λyt −1
λ 2
)+
γ
2
(it − i∗)2, (3.23)
where λ captures the asymmetry in the loss function with respect to the output gap and other
notations are the same as in (3.1).
By following the steps in Section 3.2.3, we derive a policy rule in which the interest rate
responds to inflation, output gap, the variance of inflation and the variance of output gap.3
3Appendix B.4 presents the derivation in detail.
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Fig. 3.7 Robustness Check with Three-Year Moving Average Unemployment Gap
Note: Dashed lines are 68% and 90% percentile intervals.
3.4 Data and Empirical Results 47
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
0
1
2
3
4
(a) Response to Real Activity
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
(b) Response to Inflation
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
(c) Response to Inflation Variance
Fig. 3.8 Robustness Check with Historical Average Unemployment Gap
Note: Dashed lines are 68% and 90% percentile intervals.
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Fig. 3.9 Measures of Real Activity for the Contemporaneous Quarter.
The corresponding empirical model is then given by
it =
1
1+ exp(−b6,t) it−1+
exp(−b6,t)
1+ exp(−b6,t)(b0,t+b1,tπt|t+b2,tσ
2
πt |t+b3,tyt|t+b4,tσ
2
yt |t)+exp(b5,t)εt
(3.24)
and the state vector becomes xt = [b0,t ,b1,t ,b2,t ,b3,t ,b4,t ,b5,t ,b6,t ]′.
The estimation of (3.24) requires the data of the expected variance of output gap which is
not available. We describe the construction of this series in Appendix B.4.1. Other variables
remain as in the baseline model.
Figure 3.11 presents the time-varying parameter results. It is apparent that the response
to inflation, output gap, and the variance of inflation are essentially similar with those in the
baseline model. Meanwhile, the response to the variance of output gap is mostly insignif-
icant over the sample. Overall, the results are again in line with those documented in the
baseline model.
3.4.5 Discussion
Our discussion focuses on two issues. First, based on the empirical results, we interpret how
inflation stabilization was achieved. This is accomplished by addressing crucial differences
in the conduct of monetary policy between the pre-Volcker period and the Volcker period.
Second, we provide an interpretation of monetary policy in the post-1990 period that appears
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Fig. 3.11 Robustness Check with Asymmetric Preferences to Both Inflation and Output Gap
Note: Dashed lines are 68% and 90% percentile intervals.
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to have responded weakly to inflation.
We begin with the issue on inflation stabilization. Our results suggest that this achieve-
ment can be attributed to both changes in the direct response to inflation, as suggested
by Clarida et al. (1999, 2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005, 2001), and Boivin (2006), and
changes in preferences, as put forward by Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), Dolado et al.
(2004), and Surico (2007). Regarding the former, the response to inflation was weak in
the second half of the 1970s, which likely contributed to the high level of inflation during
this era. In contrast, the strong response to inflation in the 1980s played a role in bringing
inflation down and keeping it stable. Nevertheless, this explanation may not be completely
satisfactory because the confidence bounds of the estimated coefficient on expected inflation
suggest that monetary policy between the pre-Volcker period and the Volcker years were not
essentially different as indicated by the point estimates. Moreover, the pre-1975 inflation is
hardly explained if we rely only on the direct response to inflation.
It appears that the Fed’s preferences changed in the late 1970s as well. Prior to that,
the Fed’s behavior was seemingly asymmetric in the sense that negative inflation deviations
from the target are considered to be more costly than positive ones of the same magnitude.
This asymmetry led to inflationary bias in the conduct of monetary policy, which might
have accounted for the great inflation during this decade. On the contrary, we do not find
the evidence of such an inflationary bias from the early 1980s onwards.
If so, the question that arises is what made the Fed’s preference shift. According to
De Long (1997), the Fed in the 1970s did not have enough autonomy to control inflation.
The author provides extensive narrative evidence about the influence of Nixon’s administra-
tion on the Chairmanship of Burns at the Fed. Among those is the following conversation
between Richard Nixon (the speaker) and Arthur Burns (the listener), reported in Ehrlich-
man (1982), on October 23 1969, after Nixon had announced his intention to nominate
Burns to replace Martin as chairman of the Fed:
I know there’s the myth of the autonomous Fed... [short laugh] and when you go
up for confirmation some Senator may ask you about your friendship with the
President. Appearances are going to be important, so you can call Ehrlichman
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to get messages to me, and he’ll call you (Ehrlichman, 1982, p.248-249 cited in
De Long, 1997, p.263).
The Fed was therefore quite sensitive to the concerns of political authorities, who were not
willing to accept the possibility of recession to lower inflation given the prevailing view of a
permanent negative trade-off between unemployment and inflation at the time. Disinflation
might have been thought to be more costly than inflation, so that it would be better not
to reduce inflation or to do so substantially gradually (Taylor, 1997). However, given fear
about the possibility of unanchored structure of expectations and the permanent double-
digit inflation, fighting inflation by inducing a significant recession actually became the
Fed’s mandate in 1979 (De Long, 1997). This implies a greater independence of the Fed
since then. In addition, Taylor (1992) argues that changes in the perceptions of how the
economy works at the early 1980s, which rejects the trade-off view between unemployment
and inflation, provided more impetus to curb inflation. For these reasons, the post-1980
monetary policy less likely created inflationary bias than it used to do in the 1970s.
We continue with the interpretation of the post-1990 conduct of monetary policy. In
short, the inflation coefficient began to fall at the beginning of the 1990s, becoming sta-
tistically insignificant by the mid-1990s (Figure 3.4), while the response to real activity
increased substantially. These features appear to be consistent with the opportunistic ap-
proach to disinflation in conducting monetary policy. The idea of this approach is that if
inflation stays within a range around a target, the interest rate should not respond to infla-
tion, but rather should wait for external circumstances to bring inflation back to the target.
In this case, the focus is on stabilizing output (Orphanides and Wilcox, 2002).
Although the response to inflation variance has been insignificant since the early 1980s,
its point estimate seems to be relevant to the opportunistic approach as well. Specifically,
the estimate increased substantially from the mid-1990s and has been mainly above zero
since the early 2000s (Figure 3.5) (with the HP output gap, Figure 3.10, it has even become
positive since the mid-1990s). This finding is apparently consistent with an aspect of the
opportunistic approach that the variance of shocks matter. If the variance of shocks were
to increase, the speed of convergence to the long-run target would increase as well (Aksoy
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et al., 2006).
The opportunistic approach is first described by President Boehne of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia during the FOMC meeting in December 1989:
Now, sooner or later, we will have a recession. I don’t think anybody around
the table wants a recession or is seeking one, but sooner or later we will have
one. If in that recession we took advantage of the anti-inflation (impetus) and
we got inflation down from 4 1/2 percent to 3 percent, and then in the next
expansion we were able to keep inflation from accelerating, sooner or later there
will be another recession out there. And so, if we could bring inflation down
from cycle to cycle just as we let it build up from cycle to cycle, that would be
considerable progress over what we’ve done in other periods in history (Federal
Reserve Board, 1989, p.19).
Alan Blinder, a former Vice Chairman of the Fed, also testified this issue before the Senate
committee in 1994:
If monetary policy is used to cut our losses on the inflation front when luck
runs against us, and pocket the gains when good fortune runs our way, we can
continue to chip away at the already low inflation rate (Blinder, 1994, p.4).
The timing of these statements coincides with changes in monetary policy in the post-
1990 period, including the insignificant response of monetary policy to inflation. Regarding
the empirical evidence, Martin and Milas (2010) also point out that expected inflation since
the early 1990s seldom moved away from the zone of inaction.
The insignificant response to inflation can be also explained from the statistical per-
spective. If inflation was close to the implicit target in the post-1990 period as suggested by
Martin and Milas (2010), it might be hard to identify the response of interest rate to inflation
due to lack of variability.
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3.5 Conclusion
This study analyzed how the conduct of U.S. monetary policy has changed since the late
1960s by accounting for the four issues that have been highlighted as important in the
literature, including the type of time-variation in policy parameters, the treatment of het-
eroscedasticity, the real-time nature of data, and the role of asymmetric preferences. The
findings show that monetary policy since the late 1960s has evolved richly in terms both of
the response to inflation and real activity and of preferences. Specifically, the Fed behaved
like having asymmetric preferences, which induced inflation bias, in the pre-Volcker period,
but changed to symmetric preferences in the post-Volcker era. Regarding the response to
inflation, it was strong in the first half of the 1970s and the 1980s, but weak elsewhere.
Meanwhile, the response to real activity was seemingly weaker in the 1980s than in other
periods. The properties and timings of these changes, which suggests a nontrivial role of
monetary policy in economic performances, are highly consistent with the literature on the
evolution of monetary policy.
Chapter 4
Financial Frictions and the Volatility of
Monetary Policy Shocks
4.1 Introduction
The role of financial frictions in business cycles has been attracting the interest of both aca-
demics and policy makers, especially after the recent financial crisis. The seminal work of
Bernanke et al. (1999) develops a framework combining nominal rigidities with an agency
cost model and argues that endogenous developments in the credit market can significantly
amplify and propagate shocks to the economy through the financial accelerator mechanism.
The core of this mechanism lies at the negative relationship between the net worth of firms
and the external premium demanded by lenders. With respect to monetary policy, their
model shows that an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate decreases the de-
mand for capital and therefore causes a fall in its price. The decline in the value of capital
reduces entrepreneurs’ net worth and thus leads to a higher external premium, which fur-
ther lowers investment and output. Christensen and Dib (2008) and Christiano et al. (2010),
among others, provide quantitative evidence to support the financial accelerator and assert
that financial frictions play a significant role in transmitting monetary policy disturbances
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to the real economy.1
This work investigates further the interaction between financial frictions and monetary
policy. However, our attention is directed to the impact of changes in the volatility of mon-
etary policy on the economy instead of those in its level. Shifts in the volatility of monetary
policy are important because they relate to monetary policy uncertainty which has been a
pivotal theme in policy discussions, especially after the recent financial crisis. For example,
hawks and doves at the Federal Reserve System have argued about the extent of quanti-
tative easing and the appropriate monetary stance given opposing signals from core and
headline inflation measures (Born and Pfeifer, 2014). Furthermore, an increasing number
of studies (for instance, Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2010a; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008;
Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013) have shown that the volatility of monetary policy shocks has
changed substantially in the U.S. Specifically, it was large during the Great Inflation of the
mid 1970s and early 1980s, became mild after the mid 1980s and increased significantly
during the recent crisis (Mumtaz and Zanetti, 2013).
In order to model changes in the volatility of shocks, the literature has proposed three
alternatives: stochastic volatility, GARCH, and Markov regime switching models. A de-
tailed comparison between these approaches is reported in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2010). We use the first method following most of the literature on macroeco-
nomics and volatility (for example, Arellano et al., 2010; Born and Pfeifer, 2014; Cesa-
Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo, 2014; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2010a; Gilchrist et al.,
2014; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008). With this specification, there are two types of shocks
relating to monetary policy: one affects the level of the interest rate (first moment shocks
or structural shocks or level shocks) and the other affects the standard deviation of the in-
terest rate (second moment shocks or volatility shocks). Note that we assume the nominal
interest rate to be the only instrument of monetary policy, as opposed to a monetary supply
aggregate, following Smets and Wouters (2007). This assumption appears to be reasonable
to describe U.S. monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1999).
1Christensen and Dib (2008) estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the Bernanke-
Gerltler-Gilchrist financial frictions for the U.S. economy, while Christiano et al. (2010) consider both the
Euro Area and the U.S.
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We incorporate the stochastic volatility of monetary policy into a sticky-price DSGE
model embedded with the financial frictions a` la Bernanke et al. (1999). We also allow
time-variation in the standard deviations of other structural innovations, including those of
government spending innovations, investment-specific technology innovations, and technol-
ogy innovations, in order to capture aggregate dynamics. The diverse sources of volatility
in our study are desirable as argued by the growing literature on the role of volatility in
business fluctuations such as Sims and Zha (2006) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)
among others. Moreover, Hamilton (2008) shows that even if the object of interest is in the
conditional mean, correctly modeling time-varying volatility can still be quite important.
Stochastic volatility has been mostly ignored in the literature on financial frictions though.
Our work is related to the studies on the aggregate effects of uncertainty. Although this
strand has been rapidly growing since the recent financial crisis (for instance, Alexopoulos
and Cohen, 2009; Bachmann and Bayer, 2011; Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012; Popescu
and Smets, 2010), there are only few studies on the effects of policy uncertainty.2 Mumtaz
and Zanetti (2013) estimate an SVAR model for the U.S. economy and show that an increase
in the volatility of monetary policy leads to a fall in output growth. The authors also calibrate
a simple DSGE model enriched with the time-varying standard deviation of monetary policy
shocks in order to match with and provide an interpretation of SVAR results. Born and
Pfeifer (2014) consider both fiscal and monetary uncertainty in a DSGE model and conclude
that policy risk has an adverse effect on output. This result is also supported by Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2013) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011). The role of financial frictions
are not considered in these models though.
The present study is one of the few that integrates volatility and financial frictions, which
are the two important issues emerging from the crisis, into a united framework to analyze
macroeconomic dynamics. We briefly review this branch as follows. Dorofeenko et al.
2The influential paper of Bloom (2009) shows that jumps in uncertainty in response to major economic
and political shocks cause firms to pause their investment and hiring, leading to a fall in productivity growth
and then in output and employment. Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012) affirm that an
increase in the uncertainty results in a sharp drop and slow recovery in GDP. In contrast, Bachmann and Bayer
(2011) argue that uncertainty is unlikely to be a major quantitative source of business cycles. Popescu and
Smets (2010) report similar results with Bachmann and Bayer (2011).
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(2008) extend the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) agency cost model to study the effect of
the volatility of firm’s idiosyncratic productivity shocks and show that an increase in the
volatility leads to a fall in investment supply. Christiano et al. (2014) consider a so-called
risk shock in an estimated DSGE model incorporating the Bernanke et al. (1999) financial
frictions and find that an increase in this shock reduces consumption, investment, and out-
put. Moreover, they argue that this shock plays the most important role in driving the U.S.
business cycles over the 1985-2010 period. Arellano et al. (2010) build a model with het-
erogeneous firms and financial frictions and find that increases in uncertainty at the firm
level cause a large increase in the dispersion of growth rates across firms and a contraction
in economic activity. Gilchrist et al. (2014) consider a model with heterogeneous firms,
partial investment, irreversible, nonconvex capital adjustment costs, and financial frictions
in both the debt and equity markets. The authors document the negative effects of firm level
uncertainty shocks on the economy and argue that credit spreads are an important chan-
nel through which uncertainty shocks affect the economy. Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-
Corugedo (2014) investigate the impacts of two different types of uncertainty shocks: TFP
and firm level uncertainty. They find that the latter has a greater impact on economic ac-
tivity because it is greatly magnified by credit frictions. Finally, Bonciani and Van Roye
(2013) consider the volatility of TFP and show that financial frictions amplify the effect of
uncertainty on the economy.
Our work differs from the above papers in two important aspects. First, we are, to our
best knowledge, the first to investigate the interaction between financial frictions and policy
uncertainty. Second, the parameters of exogenous processes of volatility in our study are
jointly estimated with other parameters of the model instead of being calibrated as common
in this strand of the literature. Note that a few papers have used proxies for uncertainty
shocks to estimate those parameters separately while calibrating other parameters of the
model- an approach that differs from the one applied in this study.
Regarding the estimation, likelihood-based inference is a useful tool to take DSGE mod-
els to the data (An and Schorfheide, 2007). However, those models mostly do not imply a
likelihood function that can be calculated numerically or analytically. Therefore, the model
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must be solved before it can be estimated. Linear approximation methods are very popular
because they result in a linear state-space representation of the model whose likelihood can
be obtained by the Kalman filter (An and Schorfheide, 2007). Nevertheless, in a linearized
version of our model, stochastic volatility would drop, canceling any possibility of study-
ing its impacts on the real economy. We therefore have to solve the model to higher-order
approximations. This solution however leads to a non-linear state-space representation so
that the Kalman filter can not be utilized to evaluate the likelihood function. To overcome
this issue, Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) propose to use the particle fil-
ter which performs sequential Monte Carlo estimation using a point mass representation
of probability densities. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) apply the method to estimate a
DSGE model with stochastic volatility. Following these studies, we take advantages of the
particle filter to evaluate the likelihood function in a maximum likelihood framework. We
use U.S. data for the estimation.
The results first show that our model captures aggregate dynamics relatively well. Sec-
ond, we find that an increase in the volatility of monetary policy shocks causes a contraction
in consumption, investment, output and hours worked. The model is therefore successful in
generating business-cycle co-movements among key macroeconomic variables, suggesting
that monetary policy uncertainty might have played a certain role in business cycles (Basu
and Bundick, 2012). Moreover, this contractionary effect resembles the findings of Mumtaz
and Zanetti (2013) and Born and Pfeifer (2014). Most importantly, we argue that financial
frictions amplify and propagate the transmission of volatility shocks to the economy through
the financial accelerator mechanism. This finding is in line with Gilchrist et al. (2014) and
Bonciani and Van Roye (2013).
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the baseline DSGE
model. Section 4.3 shows the state-space representation of the model. In section 4.4, we
present the estimates of model parameters and of structural and volatility shocks. Section
4.5 analyzes impulse response functions. Finally, section 4.6 concludes.
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4.2 The DSGE Model
Our model is a cashless-limited closed-economy New Keynesian DSGE model that incor-
porates the financial-accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999). In this
small-sized model of the economy, there are five agents: households, capital producers,
entrepreneurs, retailers and policy authorities. Households make decisions on consump-
tion and hours worked to maximize their utilities subject to their intertemporal budget con-
straints. Capital producers transform the investment component of output into new capital
goods which replace depreciated capital and add to capital stock. Entrepreneurs produce
wholesale goods. They borrow from financial intermediates to cover for the difference
between the expenditure on new capital and their net worth. Because of imperfect infor-
mation between entrepreneurs and lenders, the former faces an external finance premium
that rises when their leverage increases. This is how financial frictions are incorporated
into the model. Retailers are introduced to motivate sticky prices. They buy the wholesale
goods from the entrepreneurs, transform them into differentiated goods, and set prices in
the Calvo type. Finally, authorities conduct both monetary and fiscal policy. The nominal
interest rate, which is supposed to be the only tool of monetary policy, follows a Taylor rule
that responds to the deviations of inflation and output from their steady states. Regarding
fiscal policy, government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes.
Although our main interest is on monetary policy innovations, we include technology
innovations, investment specific technology innovations, and government spending innova-
tions into the model to capture aggregate dynamics. All standard deviations are assumed to
be time-varying following an AR(1) process. Consequently, there are four structural shocks
and four volatility ones brought into the model, which makes the number of shocks driving
the economy eight.
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4.2.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption Ct , the amount of risk-less bonds Bt+1
and hours worked ht to maximize the following lifetime utility function
Et
∞
∑
k=0
β k
(
log(Ct+k−χCt+k−1)−ϖ
h1+ϑt+k
1+ϑ
)
, (4.1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, χ controls habit persistence, ϖ controls the level of
labor supply, and ϑ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Moreover, Ct is the consumption
index given by
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
1− 1ζ di
) ζ
ζ−1
, (4.2)
where ζ is the elasticity of substitution and Ct(i) represents the quantity of good i consumed
by the household in period t. We assume the existence of a continuum of goods represented
by the interval [0,1].
Maximization of (4.1) is subject to a sequence of flow budget constraints given by
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)Ct(i)di
Pt
+
Bt+1
Pt
≤ Rn,t−1Bt
Pt
+
Wtht
Pt
+Transfers+Profits, (4.3)
where Pt(i) is the price of good i, Bt+1 is the amount of risk-less bonds held between period
t and period t + 1 which pay a nominal gross interest rate Rn,t at maturity, and Wt is the
wage rate. The household receives lump-sum transfers from the government and profits
from firms. Pt is the aggregate price index given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ζdi
) 1
1−ζ
.
For each differentiated good i, the household must decide how to choose Ci to maximize
(4.2) for any given level of expenditures
∫ 1
0 Pt(i)Ct(i)di. The first-order solution yields the
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set of demand equations for consumption
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ζ
Ct ,
for all i ∈ [0,1]. Thus, ∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Ct(i)di = PtCt . (4.4)
Substituting (4.4) into the budget constraint (4.3) results in
Ct +
Bt+1
Pt
≤ Rn,t−1Bt
Pt
+
Wt
Pt
ht +Transfers+Profits. (4.5)
We then derive the first-order conditions for the household’s problem as follows
1
Ct −χCt−1 −βEt(χ
1
Ct+1−χCt ) = λt ,
λt = βEt(λt+1
Rn,t
Πt+1
),
ϖhϑt = λt
Wt
Pt
,
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint in (4.5).
4.2.2 Capital Producers
Suppose that there is a single, representative, competitive capital producer who uses a
portion of final goods purchased from retailers as investment goods It to produce capital
goods. The production, which is subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs S(.) and an
investment-specific technology shock κt , generates eκt (1− S( ItIt−1 ))It capital goods. These
goods are sold at a real price Qt per unit at the end of period t.
The adjustment cost function, similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Christiano et al.
(2005), is specified as
S
(
It
It−1
)
= φs(
It
It−1
−1)2,
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where φs is the adjustment parameter. Along the balanced growth path, S(1) = S′(1) = 0.
The investment specific technology shock is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
κt = ρκ κt−1+σκeσκtεκt , εκt ∼N (0,1),
where σκt is the time-variant component of the standard deviation of investment specific
technology shock εκt . Its evolution is given by
σκt = ρσκ σκt−1+ηκuκt , uκt ∼N (0,1).
The capital producer’s optimization problem is to maximize its discounted profits with
respect to It
Et
∞
∑
k=0
Λt,t+k[Qt+keκt+k(1−S(Xt+k))It+k− It+k],
where Xt = ItIt−1 and Λt,t+k is the real stochastic discount factor over the interval [t, t+ k].
The first-order condition for this problem is
Qteκt (1−S(Xt)−XtS′(Xt))+Et [Λt,t+1Qt+1eκt+1S′(Xt+1)X2t+1] = 1.
The produced capital goods combine with the existing capital stock to generate new
capital goods. In other words, the capital accumulation process is described by
Kt = (1−δ )Kt−1+ eκt (1−S(Xt))It .
4.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage the firms that produce the wholesale goods. This production uses
labor and capital. While the former is supplied by both households and entrepreneurs, the
latter is bought from capital producers. The entrepreneurs finance the expenditure on capital
by entrepreneurial net worth (internal finance) and debts (external finance). In the latter, they
face an external finance premium caused by the inability of lenders to monitor borrowers’
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actions or to share borrowers’ information. In this way, financial market imperfections are
introduced into the model.
The premium relies on the balance-sheet condition of the entrepreneurs. When their net
worth declines, internal sources of funds are limited, forcing them to seek external sources
by borrowing. However, the deterioration of their balance sheets causes the potential diver-
gence between them (the borrowers) and the lenders to be greater, leading to an increase in
agency costs. Consequently, the cost of external finance is pushed up resulting in a contrac-
tion in investment spending and then output.
The entrepreneurs are risk neutral. They are endowed with het units of entrepreneurial
labor at the nominal entrepreneurial wage W et in order to start off. Moreover, each of them
is assumed to survive until the next period with a probability σE . This is to assure that they
do not accumulate enough funds to finance their expenditures on capital only with their net
worth. New entrepreneurs are allowed to enter to replace those exiting.
Production. The wholesale goods are produced according to a constant-return-to-scale
technology
YWt = e
at A(Ht)1−αKαt−1,
where Kt−1 denotes the number of capital units, Ht is the labor input which is a composite
of household labor ht and entrepreneurial labor het , A is the level of technology which is
normalized to one, and at is a shifter to the technology level which evolves as
at = ρaat−1+σaeσat εat , εat ∼N (0,1),
where σat is the time-variant component of the standard deviation of technology shock εat
and it follows an AR(1) process
σat = ρσaσat−1+ηauat , uat ∼N (0,1).
For the labor input, het is assumed to be constant at one. In addition, the share of income
going to the entrepreneurial labor is calibrated to be small (the order of 0.01), so that the
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modification of the production function does not have substantial effects on the results. The
labor input Ht is written as follows
Ht = hΩt (h
e
t )
1−Ω.
The demand for household and entrepreneurial labor is obtained by equating the marginal
product of each type of labor to its corresponding cost
PWt
Pt
(1−α)ΩYWt
ht
=
Wt
Pt
, (4.6)
PWt
Pt
(1−α)(1−Ω)YWt
het
=
W et
Pt
. (4.7)
Meanwhile, the demand for capital of the entrepreneurs is considered below with the occur-
rence of financial frictions.
Financial frictions. At the end of time t, an entrepreneur borrows lt equivalent to the
difference between the expenditure on new capital Qtkt and the net worth nE,t
lt = Qtkt −nE,t .
The net worth accumulation nE,t is calculated by3
nE,t = ψtRk,tQt−1kt−1−Rl,t lt−1,
where ψt is an idiosyncratic shock to the entrepreneur’s return,4 Rl,t is the real loan rate set
at time t−1, and Rk,t is the real return on capital computed by
Rk,t =
α P
W
t
Pt
YWt
Kt−1 +(1−δ )Qt
Qt−1
.
3Lower case variables denote the representative entrepreneur, while upper case variables introduced later
denote the aggregate.
4The shock at t+1 is revealed at the end of period t right before investment decisions are made.
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Note that the idiosyncratic shock is the private information of the entrepreneur. We
follow Bernanke et al. (1999) to assume that ψt is distributed log-normally with positive
support and its standard deviation is time-invariant. The distribution of ψt hence can be
written as follows
log(ψt)∼N (−1/2σ2ψ ,σ2ψ),
where σψ is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock ψt .
At time t+1, if the net worth nE,t+1 becomes negative, the entrepreneur is bankrupt. In
other words, the default occurs if the idiosyncratic shock falls below the cut-off value ψ¯t+1
given by
ψ t+1 =
Rl,t+1lt
Rk,t+1Qtkt
. (4.8)
Otherwise, the entrepreneur makes the full payment of her loans, Rl,t+1lt , to the lender.
Let fψt and ψmin be the density function and the lower bound of ψt , respectively. Then,
the probability of default at time t+1 is calculated by
F(ψ t+1) =
∫ ψt+1
ψmin
f (ψ)dψ.
If default happens, the lender obtains the assets of the firm. However, it has to pay a propor-
tion µ to observe the realized return. Therefore, the expected gross return on the loan of the
lender is given by
Et
[
(1−F(ψ t+1))Rl,t+1lt +(1−µ)Rk,t+1Qtkt
∫ ψt+1
ψmin
ψ f (ψ)dψ
]
.
Substituting Rl,t+1lt by ψ t+1Rk,t+1Qtkt (see (4.8)) yields
Et
[
Rk,t+1Qtkt(ψ t+1(1−F(ψ t+1))+(1−µ)
∫ ψt+1
ψmin
ψ f (ψ)dψ)
]
. (4.9)
Define Γ(ψ t+1) as the share of entrepreneurial earnings accrued to the lender
Γ(ψ t+1) = ψ t+1(1−F(ψ t+1))+G(ψ t+1), (4.10)
4.2 The DSGE Model 67
where
G(ψ t+1) =
∫ ψt+1
ψmin
ψ f (ψ)dψ. (4.11)
For the optimal contract, the entrepreneur needs to find kt and ψ t+1 to maximize her
expected net earnings
Et
[
(1−Γ(ψ t+1))Rk,t+1Qtkt
]
, (4.12)
subject to
Et
[
Rk,t+1Qtkt(Γ(ψ t+1)−µG(ψ t+1))
]
= Et(Rext+1lt). (4.13)
The constraint reflects the assumption that the lender is indifferent between the expected
return from lending to the entrepreneur and the one from owning risk-free bonds. Then,
using the Lagrange multiplier method, we obtain
Et [Rk,t+1] = Et [ι(ψ t+1)R
ex
t+1],
where ι(ψ t+1) is the premium on external finance given by
ι(ψ t+1) =
Γ′(ψ t+1)
(1−Γ(ψ t+1))(Γ′(ψ t+1)−µG′(ψ t+1))+Γ′(ψ t+1)(Γ(ψ t+1)−µG(ψ t+1))
.
(4.14)
For the calculation of Γ(.),Γ′(.),G(.) and G′(.), see Appendix C.1.
So far we have established the optimizing decision of a representative entrepreneur. We
now assume that a fraction 1−σE of entrepreneurs exits at the end of period t−1 and they
consume all their residual equities. Therefore, the aggregate net worth accumulating at the
end of time t is calculated by
NE,t = σE(1−Γ(ψ t))Rk,tQt−1Kt−1+
WE,t
Pt
and the consumption of the exiting entrepreneurs is
CE,t = (1−σE)(1−Γ(ψ t))Rk,tQt−1Kt−1.
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4.2.4 Retailers
In order to motivate sticky prices, two additional ingredients are added to the model. First,
the retail sector is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Second, there are costs of
adjusting nominal prices.
Optimal Price Setting. Retailers purchase the wholesale goods from the entrepreneurs
and transform them into differentiated goods according to
Yt =
YWt
∆t
,
where Yt = (
∫ 1
0 Yt(i)
1− 1ζ di)
ζ
ζ−1 and ∆t =
∫ 1
0 (
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ζdi is the price dispersion. The retailers
then set prices to optimize their expected profits. The setting is however constrained by the
so-called Calvo-typed price rigidity (Calvo, 1983). Specifically, each retailer can reoptimize
her price in a given period with a constant probability 1− ξ . The law of large number
suggests that a fraction 1−ξ of firms re-optimize their prices at each period. The remaining
retailers are assumed to adjust their prices based on the lagged inflation with a degree of
indexation γ ∈ [0,1] in order to capture the inertia observed in the response of inflation to a
monetary policy shock (Woodford, 2003).
Given a common real marginal cost MCt to all retail firms, a new price P∗t (i) chosen by
the retailer i in period t should maximize her discounted nominal profits given by
Et
∞
∑
k=0
ξ kDt,t+kYt+k(i)
[
P∗t (i)
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γ
−Pt+kMCt+k
]
,
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Yt+k(i) =
(
Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
)−ζ
Yt+k.
Note that Dt,t+k = β k
λt+k
λt is the nominal stochastic discount factor over the interval [t, t+k]
and k = 0,1,2, ....
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The first order condition associated with the above problem has the form
Et
∞
∑
k=0
ξ kDt,t+kYt+k(i)
[
P∗t (i)
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γ
−M Pt+k MCt+k
]
= 0, (4.15)
whereM ≡ ζζ−1 is the frictionless markup. We rearrange Dt,t+kYt+k(i) as follows
Dt,t+kYt+k(i) = β k
λt+k
λt
Pt
Pt+k
[
P∗t (i)
Pt+k
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)γ]−ζ
Yt+k
= β k
λt+k
λt
Pt
Pt+k
(
P∗t (i)
Pt+k
)−ζ (Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)−ζγ
Yt+k
= β k
λt+k
λt
(
P∗t (i)
Pt
)−ζ
Πζ−1t,t+kΠ
−ζγ
t−1,t+k−1Yt+k,
where Πt,t+k =
Pt+k
Pt
. By substituting this rearrangement into (4.15), then canceling out
(
P∗t (i)
Pt
)−ζ and multiplying by λtPt in (4.15), we get
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(ξβ )kλt+kΠ
ζ−1
t,t+kΠ
−ζγ
t−1,t+k−1Yt+k
[
P∗t (i)
Pt
Πγt−1,t+k−1−M Πt,t+k MCt+k
]
= 0.
This is equivalent to
P∗t (i)
Pt
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(ξβ )kλt+kYt+kΠ
ζ−1
t,t+k =MEt
∞
∑
k=0
(ξβ )kλt+kYt+kΠ
ζ
t,t+k MCt+k, (4.16)
where Πt = ΠtΠγt−1
. We now define
Ht = Et
∞
∑
k=0
(ξβ )kλt+kYt+kΠ
ζ−1
t,t+k (4.17)
and
Jt =MEt
∞
∑
k=0
(ξβ )kλt+kYt+kΠ
ζ
t,t+k MCt+k. (4.18)
From (4.17) and (4.18), we derive
Ht −ξβEt [Πζ−1t+1 Ht+1] = λtYt
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and
Jt −ξβEt [Πζt+1Jt+1] =M λt MCtYt .
Combining (4.16), (4.17), and (4.18) yields
P∗t (i)
Pt
=
Jt
Ht
. (4.19)
Aggregate Price Level Dynamics. Equation (4.19) implies that all the retailers that are
resetting their prices will choose an identical price which is P∗t . The aggregate price level at
time t therefore evolves according to
Pt =
[
(1−ξ )P∗1−ζt +ξ
(
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γ)1−ζ] 11−ζ
. (4.20)
Dividing both side of (4.20) by Pt results in
1 = (1−ξ )
(
Jt
Ht
)1−ζ
+ξΠζ−1t .
4.2.5 The Central Bank
The model is closed by the presence of a central bank that sets the nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor-type rule
Rn,t
Rn
=
(
Rn,t−1
Rn
)ρr((Πt
Π
)θπ (Yt
Y
)θy)(1−ρr)
eσme
σmt εmt , εmt ∼N (0,1),
where εm,t is the monetary policy innovation whose time-varying component of the standard
deviation σmt evolves according to an AR(1) process
σmt = ρσmσmt−1+ηmumt , umt ∼N (0,1).
In the Taylor rule, the first term on the right-hand-side Rn,t−1Rn represents the smoothing behav-
ior of the central bank in setting the interest rate. The second term ΠtΠ denotes the deviation
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of inflation from its steady levelΠ. The third term YtY is the output gap which is the deviation
of output from its balanced state Y .
4.2.6 Resource Constraint
The market for final goods clears in every period
Yt =Ct +CE,t + It +Gegt +µG(ψ t)Rk,tQt−1Kt−1.
In that the government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes on the basis of a balanced
budget. Government spending, whose steady state is G, is influenced by an exogenous shock
gt following an AR(1) process
gt = ρggt−1+σgeσgtεgt , εgt ∼N (0,1),
where εgt is the government spending shock. The time-varying component of the standard
deviation is σgt whose evolution is given by
σgt = ρσgσgt−1+ηgugt , ugt ∼N (0,1).
4.3 State-Space Representation
4.3.1 State Transition Equations
The optimal decisions of households, capital producers, entrepreneurs, and retailers, the
Taylor rule and the resource constraint form a non-linear rational expectations system. This
system can not be estimated by likelihood-based approaches directly because the system
does not imply a likelihood function that can be calculated numerically or analytically
(Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007). Therefore, we need to solve the model
before estimating it.
As regarded in the introduction, the most popular method in the literature is lineariza-
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tion because it leads to a linear state space representation of the model whose likelihood
can be obtained by the Kalman filter (An and Schorfheide, 2007). However, linearization
is certainty-equivalent, which means that all volatility shocks will be dropped out, therefore
canceling any chance of analyzing their impacts on the economy. In a second-order approx-
imation, volatility shocks enter as cross-products with the corresponding level shocks in the
policy functions. In a third-order approximation, volatility shocks play a role by themselves,
thus allowing us to calculate the impulse response functions to a monetary volatility shock,
while holding constant its level shock. This feature makes the third-order approximation
very attractive, but it comes with high computational costs in the estimation, given that the
particle filter is employed to obtain the likelihood function (see the computational issues
of particle filters in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez, 2007). In contrast, although
the second-order approximation does not allow us to investigate the independent effects of
volatility shocks, it is sufficient to estimate the parameters of the model including those of
stochastic processes, while having smaller computational costs than the third-order approx-
imation does. Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2015) also estimate dynamic macroeconomic models with stochastic volatility based
on their second-order approximations. Therefore, we first follow those papers to estimate
a second-order approximation of our DSGE model. Given the estimates, we then solve the
model to a third-order approximation and compute the impulse response functions to a mon-
etary volatility shock. By using such a strategy, we can take advantages of each method.5
Let st be the vector of all variables of the model at time t with each variable expressed in
terms of log deviation from its steady state. The system is driven by the vector of structural
shocks vt = (εκt ,εat ,εgt ,εmt) and by the vector of volatility shocks wt = (uκt ,uat ,ugt ,umt).
The solution of the rational expectations system takes the form
st =Θ(st−1,vt ,wt ;Ξ), (4.21)
where Ξ is the vector of parameters in the model. Equation (4.21) represents the state
5We apply the pruning procedure to avoid the explosion which often happens to paths simulated by the
higher-order approximated model. See Kim et al. (2008) and Andreasen et al. (2013) for more details.
4.3 State-Space Representation 73
transition equations in the state-space representation, which is non-linear.6 The following
part describes the measurement equations.
4.3.2 Measurement Equations
We assume that the time period t corresponds to one quarter. For the estimation, we use four
data series including the Hodrick-Prescott output gap per capita, the log difference of the
GDP deflator, the federal funds rate, and the Moody’s seasoned data corporate bond yields,
which are denoted by OUTt , INFt , INRt , and CBYt , respectively. Details on the sources
and constructions of these time series are documented in Appendix C.2. These series are
connected to the model variables by
INFt = Πˆt +σmπεmπ,t , εmπ,t ∼N (0,1),
OUTt = Yˆt +σmyεmy,t , εmy,t ∼N (0,1),
INRt = Rˆn,t +σmrnεmrn,t , εmrn,t ∼N (0,1),
CBYt = Rˆk,t + Πˆt +σmrkεmrk,t , εmrk,t ∼N (0,1),
where εmy,t ,εmπ,t ,εmrn,t ,andεmrk,t are measurement errors and their standard deviations are
σmy,σmπ ,σmrn andσmrk , respectively. The notation “ˆ” above a variable denotes the log
deviation of that variable from its steady state. These four measurement equations and
the state transition equations in (4.21) establish the non-linear state-space representation of
the model.
6For example, a second-order approximation is given by
s j,t =C j +
J
∑
i=1
Θ(s)j,i si,t−1+
n
∑
l=1
Θ(v)j,l vl,t +
n
∑
l=1
Θ(v2)j,k v
2
l,t +
J
∑
i=1
J
∑
l=1
Θ(ss)j,il si,t−1sl,t−1
+
J
∑
i=1
n
∑
l=1
Θ(sv)j,il si,t−1vl,t +
n
∑
l=1
Θ(vw)j,ll vl,twl,t .
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4.4 Estimation
In order to estimate the non-linear state-space system described in the previous section, we
follow Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007) to use the particle filter to evaluate
its likelihood function. Basically, the particle filter performs sequential Monte Carlo estima-
tion using a point mass representation of probability densities to approximate the posterior
density of the states and the likelihood function (see Appendix C.3 for the algorithm of
the particle filter). As discussed above, we use the four quarterly U.S. time series for the
estimation. Regarding the coverage of the sample, while including the post-2007 could be
beneficial because of the increased observations, it would introduce extra problems origi-
nating from the recent crisis and its on-going consequences, among which is the zero-lower
bound of the interest rate. Given the inherent complexity in the estimation of a higher-order
approximated model, a more ‘safe and sound’ solution is to exclude the post-2007 period.
Our sample therefore spans from 1959Q1 to 2007Q1. Advancing the model to include the
recent crisis episode into consideration is a potential expansion of our work.
We summarize the procedure of the estimation in three steps. First, given the values of
parameters, we solve the non-linear rational expectations system by performing a second-
order perturbation around the deterministic steady states. Second, we construct the state-
space representation of the model and apply the particle filter to evaluate its likelihood.
Finally, we use an maximum-likelihood algorithm to estimate parameters.
We are aware that obtaining the MLE is complicated because the shape of the likelihood
function may be rugged and multimodal. In addition, the use of optimization algorithms
based on derivatives is not applicable because the particle filter generates an approximation
to the likelihood function that is not differentiable with respect to parameters. Instead,
we follow van Binsbergen et al. (2012) to use the covariance matrix adaption evolutionary
strategy, whose aim is to cope with objective functions which are non-linear, non-convex,
multimodal, as well as those with other difficult conditions, in order to obtain the maximum-
likelihood estimates.
As customary when taking DSGE models to data, some parameters are fixed to values
which are common in the existing literature or selected to satisfy some certain conditions in
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the steady state (for instance, Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2009; Justiniano and Primiceri,
2008; Smets and Wouters, 2007). This helps to reduce the numbers of parameters required to
estimate, therefore lessening the computational issues. We discuss those fixed parameters in
subsection 4.4.1. The estimates of unknown parameters are presented in subsection 4.4.2.
Given the values of all parameters, we perform particle filtering to compute the posterior
densities of structural and volatility shocks and then estimate their means. Combining these
estimates over the sample shows us the evolution of structural and volatility shocks. They
are presented in subsection 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Fixed Parameters
The standard parameters calibrated includes {β ,ζ ,α,Ω,ϑ ,φs,χ,ϖ ,}. The discount factor
β = 0.985 is chosen to match the inverse of the average of risk-free rate observed in the U.S.
The elasticity of substitution ζ is fixed at 10 which implies a 10% markup. The elasticity
of capital to output α = 0.3 reflects the share of national income that goes to capital. As
mentioned previously, the share of income to entrepreneurial labor (1−α)(1−Ω) is set to
a very small number 0.01, which implies a value of 0.98 for Ω . The depreciation rate δ is
assigned to 0.025, which is a common value in the literature of DSGE models on the U.S.
economy. The inverse of the Frisch labor elasticity ϑ is set to 1.3 which pins down the Frisch
elasticity to around 0.75 as suggested by Chetty et al. (2011). The adjustment cost φs = 4.5
is similar to other estimates from DSGE models, for example, Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
The habit persistence χ is set to 0.9 in order to reflect the observed sluggish response of
consumption to shocks (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2010a). The steady state government
spending to GDP ratio G/Y is fixed at 0.2 to match the U.S. data on average. The parameter
controlling the level of labor supply ϖ is calibrated in such a way that generates a steady
state level of hours worked h = 0.35.
We also calibrate three non-standard financial parameters including {µ,σψ ,σE}. They
are chosen to imply the three following conditions in the steady state: (i) a probability of
default equal to 3%, (ii) a credit spread of 66.5 basis points which is consistent with the
data over the sample, and (iii) a ratio of capital to net worth QK/N of 2. Specifically, the
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fraction of realized payoffs lost in bankruptcy µ is 0.0555, the existing rate of entrepreneurs
σE is found to be 0.9708, and the steady state level of the variance of the idiosyncratic
productivity variable σψ is equal to 0.3388.
4.4.2 Parameter Estimates
Table 4.1 reports the estimates for the remaining 24 parameters. First, the degree of indexa-
tion γ is 0.2 implying a moderate inflation inertia. The price rigidity ξ is around 0.7 which
suggests that the prices are reoptimized approximately once every three quarters. This value
is common in the literature, see e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007). Regarding the estimates of
policy parameters, the response to the deviation of inflation in the long run is about 1.560,
which is close to the estimate of Christensen and Dib (2008) in a linearized DSGE model
with financial frictions. In contrast, the interest rate does not appear to respond strongly
to changes in the output gap. Given a 1% increase in the output gap, the interest rate only
rises about 7 basis points. Smets and Wouters (2007) also document a weak response to
the output gap (0.09). Finally, the interest rate shows a moderate inertia with the smoothing
parameter ρr around 0.6.
Turning to the stochastic processes of structural shocks, they appear to be consider-
ably persistent with estimated AR(1) coefficients equal to 0.962, 0.978, and 0.959 for the
investment-specific technology, technology, and government spending process, respectively.
For the time-invariant component of the standard deviations of structural shocks, the govern-
ment shock has the largest value of 0.04. The smallest figure is for the investment-specific
shock, roughly 0.0006.
Regarding the stochastic volatility processes, the standard deviation of technology shock
is the most persistent with an estimated AR(1) coefficient of 0.980, followed closely by the
coefficient of monetary shock, 0.971. The standard deviation of government shock is found
to be fairly persistent with a coefficient of 0.624. Meanwhile, the corresponding value for
the investment-specific technology shock is the least persistent, 0.424. For the standard
deviations of volatility shocks, we find that those of investment-specific technology and
government spending innovations are similar with a value of about 0.35 for each. Mean-
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Table 4.1 Parameters’ Estimates of the DSGE model
Parameter Mean S.E. (×10−2)
Nominal rigidities parameters
γ 0.203 0.308
ξ 0.708 0.162
Policy parameters
ρr 0.597 0.189
θπ 1.560 0.400
θy 0.069 0.114
Parameters of the stochastic process
for structural shocks
ρκ 0.962 0.101
ρa 0.978 0.092
ρg 0.959 0.159
σκ 0.060×10−2 0.020
σa 0.881×10−2 0.013
σm 0.188×10−2 0.004
σg 4.130×10−2 0.039
Parameters of the stochastic process
for volatility shocks
ρσκ 0.424 0.741
ρσa 0.980 0.685
ρσm 0.971 0.482
ρσg 0.624 0.651
ηκ 0.352 2.239
ηa 0.168 2.000
ηm 0.163 2.058
ηg 0.337 2.350
Parameters of
measurement equations
σmy 0.338×10−2 0.011
σmπ 0.412×10−2 0.012
σmrn 0.154×10−2 0.010
σmrk 0.434×10−2 0.012
Notes: The table shows the estimates of parameters in the baseline DSGE model in section 4.2.
while, the corresponding values of monetary and technology innovations are close to each
other, 0.17.
Finally, we find that the standard deviations of measurement noises are small, suggest-
ing that the model captures the aggregate dynamics relatively well. To corroborate the
statement, we plot the actual data and the data generated by the model (filtered states) in
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Fig. 4.1 Model vs. Data
Notes: The graphs show the data generated by the DSGE model with 2 SD bounds and the actual data.
Figure 4.1. The top left graph shows that the model captures much of the dynamics of the
real output gap per capita. The model value has a correlation of 99% with the data. The
standard deviation of the former and the latter are of equal magnitude, 0.015. The top right
plot displays the actual data and the generated data for inflation. The correlation between
them is 80% and their standard deviations are similar around 0.005. The bottom left graph
depicts the actual observation and the one created by the model for the nominal interest
rate, it appears that the model replicates the data very well with a correlation of 99% and
a standard deviation of 0.008 for each. Finally, the actual data and the value produced by
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Fig. 4.2 Structural Shocks
Notes: The graphs present the estimates of structural shocks. They are obtained by performing particle
filtering to compute the posterior densities of the shocks given the values of parameters. Combining all the
estimates of their means over the sample provides us the measures of the shocks.
the model for the nominal rate of return on capital are displayed in the bottom right graph.
Their correlation is 88% and they have similar standard deviations of 0.007. Based on these
evidence, we conclude that the model is fairly successful in characterizing the properties of
the economy.
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Notes: The graphs present the estimates of volatility shocks. They are obtained by performing particle
filtering to compute the posterior densities of the shocks given the values of parameters. Combining all the
estimates of their means over the sample provides us the measures of the shocks.
4.4.3 The Evolution of Structural and Volatility Shocks
In this subsection, we present the estimates of the structural shocks and the volatility shocks
of the model. This exercise has been done in models without financial frictions, for instance
Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010a) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
Figure 4.2 reports the evolution of structural shocks (εmt , εat , εgt , and εκt). The fig-
ure shows that our model is successful in capturing striking features documented in the
literature. First, there are two clear drops in the technology shocks in 1972− 1974 and
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1980−1981 and one substantial reduction in the investment-specific technology shocks in
1980 which are likely the consequences of the oil price shocks. Second, regarding the mon-
etary policy shocks, our model shows large fluctuations in the first half of the 1980s which
might be caused by fast changes in the policy by the Fed chairman Paul Volcker.
The volatility shocks are plotted in Figure 4.3. One common feature is that the shocks
were higher in the 1970s and early half of the 1980s than in other periods. This result there-
fore asserts Blanchard and Simon (2001)’s observation that volatility had fallen in the 20th
century with a temporal and surprising rise in the 1970s. Especially, the volatility shocks
have substantially declined since the middle of the 1980s, around 1984. McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kim and Nelson (1999) also document a decline in the volatility
of U.S real GDP growth around this point in time. Stock and Watson (2002) consider 1984
as the start of the ‘Great Moderation’ period in the U.S economy. Our results therefore sug-
gest that the fall in the magnitude of shocks might have contributed to the stability during
the Great Moderation period in the U.S., in accordance with Born and Pfeifer (2014) and
Justiniano and Primiceri (2008).
4.5 Impulse Response Functions
This section analyzes the impulse response functions (IRFs) generated by our model to a 1
S.D. monetary volatility shock umt . There are two issues deserving discussion. First, recall
that in the second order approximation the volatility shocks enter policy functions in the
cross-product with the corresponding level shocks, e.g. umtεmt . This connection prevents
us from disentangling the impact of volatility shocks on the economy. To overcome this
issue, we solve the model to the third-order approximation, given the parameters estimated
in the previous section, because at that order volatility shocks play a role by themselves,
therefore allowing us to compute the IRFs to a second-moment shock of monetary policy
while keeping its level shock unchanged.
The second issue is that the higher-order approximation of the model not only results
in a nonlinear environment, which makes the computation of IRFs somewhat complicated,
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but also makes the simulated paths of states and controls in the model move away from
their state values. To deal with these issues, we follow the process proposed by Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2011) which calculates the IRFs as percentage deviations from their er-
godic means rather than their steady states. This process includes four following steps.
1. The model is simulated for 2096 periods. The first 2000 periods are disregarded as a
burn-in.
2. We calculate the mean for each variable based on the last 96 periods. Adding more
periods does not essentially affect the mean.
3. Starting from the mean and in the absence of shocks, we hit the model with a one-
standard-deviation second-moment shock of monetary policy umt .
4. The impulse responses are defined as percentage deviations from the variables’ means.
Figure 4.4 plots the IRFs to a positive 1 S.D. monetary volatility shock. This shock
causes a prolonged contraction in economic activity: output, consumption, investment, real
wages and hours worked fall. Our model is therefore successful in generating business-cycle
co-movements in response to changes in the uncertainty of monetary policy. This feature is
an important prerequisite for any shock that seeks to explain business cycles because those
co-movements are observed in the data (see Basu and Bundick, 2012; Cesa-Bianchi and
Fernandez-Corugedo, 2014).
The principal transmission mechanism for monetary volatility shocks is in line with
Basu and Bundick (2012). The uncertainty causes households to consume less, save more,
and supply more hours worked for any given wage (precautionary behavior). The increased
labor supply decreases wages, leading to a fall in marginal cost. The decline in marginal
cost raises markups because prices adjust slowly due to price rigidity. Consequently, the
demand for household labor falls, which lowers the real wage earned by the representative
household. Moreover, the decrease in labor demand reduces investment in capital stock by
entrepreneurs. Financial frictions amplify and propagate the decrease in investment via the
financial accelerator mechanism as will be analyzed below. The increase in inflation can
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Fig. 4.4 IRFs to a 1 S.D. Monetary Volatility Shock
Notes: The graphs are expressed as percentage changes from their ergodic means.
be explained as a supply-shock-alike effect of the uncertainty because it lowers labor and
capital demand. Policy rate, which follows a Taylor rule, rises in response to the increase in
inflation. Then both inflation and the interest rate fall because of the contraction of economic
activity.
In order to investigate the role of financial frictions, we compare the IRFs to a monetary
volatility shock generated by the baseline model with those created by two counterfactual
models: one with a smaller level of financial frictions and the other with a more pronounced
level of financial frictions. These alternative cases are formed by modifying the value of
the monitoring cost parameter µ . The idea is that monitoring cost introduces a wedge in
the lender’s zero profit condition. Therefore, if the monitoring cost is higher, they require
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financial frictions: µHigh = 2µBase.
a higher return from lending, which in turn causes a greater external premium or, in other
words, a more pronounced level of financial frictions. This intuition is captured by Equation
(4.14). Figure 4.5 presents the IRFs generated by the baseline and the counterfactual models
together. The financial accelerator mechanism is prominent. The decline in capital demand
caused by increased markups leads to a fall in its price, therefore decreasing firms’ net worth.
The fall in the net worth increases the external premium required by lenders, thus forcing
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down investment and output. More importantly, we note that a higher level of financial
frictions lead to a greater premium, which decreases investment further. A kind of multiplier
effect arises, since the fall in investment lowers the price of capital and net worth, therefore
pushing down investment to a greater extent. Consequently, the decline in output is larger
when financial frictions are more pronounced and vice versa.
We conduct a number of experiments to check the robustness of the above results. These
experiments are described in Table 4.2. In the first robustness experiment (RE), the inverse
of the Frisch labor elasticity ϑ is increased, which therefore makes labor supply less flexible
in response to shocks. In the next three experiments, we decrease the values of Calvo
parameter prices ξ , capital adjustment costs φs, and consumption habits λ , thus reducing
the persistence in the model. The last experiment is related to the counteracting reaction
of monetary policy in which we shut off the response of interest rate to output gap and
considerably increase the smoothing parameter.
Table 4.2 Robustness Experiments (RE)
Parameter Descriptions Baseline RE I RE II RE III RE IV RE V
ϑ Inverse of the Frisch elasticity 1.3 10 * * * *
ξ Calvo parameter prices 0.708 * 0.6 * * *
φs Capital adjustment costs 4.5 * * 0.5 * *
λ Consumption habits 0.9 * * * 0.6 *
θy Taylor rule output gap 0.069 * * * * 0
ρr Interest smoothing 0.597 * * * * 0.98
Notes: “*” means that the value of relevant parameter in the experimental model is the same with the one in
the baseline model.
Figure 4.6 presents the impulse response functions of output to a 1 S.D. monetary volatil-
ity shock generated by these experimental models with respect to different levels of financial
frictions. Similar to the results documented above, we find in all experiments that output
falls persistently after the shock and that the more pronounced financial frictions the larger
the decline of output. Our findings are therefore robust to these experiments. Another
feature of Figure 4.6, which may be worth noting, is that the reductions of output in the
robustness experiments are mostly larger than that in the baseline model. This is somewhat
expected because the dampening general equilibrium effects and the counteracting reaction
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Notes: The graphs present the IRFs of output to a 1 S.D. monetary volatility shock, expressed as percentage
changes from their ergodic means. The level of financial frictions in the baseline model: µBase = 0.055. For
low level of financial frictions: µLow = 12µBase. For high level of financial frictions: µHigh = 2µBase.
are limited in the experiments.
Particularly, in the experiment with the monetary policy reaction function (denoted by
‘RE V’ in Figure 4.6 ), output drops by 0.5% on impact, falls as great as 1.5%, reaching to
the lowest point, after 20 quarters, and then slowly returns to its mean. A similar result is
documented by Born and Pfeifer (2014). In the baseline model, with a positive response to
output gap and a moderate value of interest smoothing parameter, monetary policy is more
aggressive and quicker to offset negative shocks, therefore mitigating the potential impacts
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of uncertainty. In the experiment V, we however force the response to output down to zero
and give more weight to past interest rates. Hence, the current economic conditions affect
the nominal interest rate less than its past values. Figure 4.7 plots the IRFs of output and
other variables to a monetary volatility shock of this experiment. The transmission mech-
anism of the shock is similar to what we discussed in the baseline model with increased
markups and greater premium. However, the sluggish response of monetary policy exacer-
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bates the contraction. While inflation reduces because of the contraction, the sluggishness
causes the nominal interest rate to fall much slower than the reduction in inflation, which
lead to an increase in the real interest rate. Consequently, investment decreases further,
which is again amplified by the existence of financial frictions in the model. Eventually,
investment falls by more than 4% after 10 quarters, resulting in a substantial decline in
output.
The finding that the more sluggish monetary policy the more substantial the effects of
monetary volatility shocks on the economy might have an important implication regarding
the zero-lower bound in the nominal interest rate, although our current model does not
explicitly account for it. In such a situation, the nominal interest rate is likely independent
to current conditions and substantially, if not completely, depends on its past values. This
limits the ability of the nominal interest rate to mitigate negative shocks to the economy,
which likely causes a greater contraction of economic activity. Basu and Bundick (2012)
consider the uncertainty of TFP shocks and argue that the uncertainty has larger effects
under the zero-lower bound. A similar result is documented by Fernández-Villaverde et al.
(2013) who consider fiscal uncertainty.
4.6 Conclusion
The study attempted to investigate the role of financial frictions in the transmission of mon-
etary volatility shocks on the economy. To do so, we employed the particle filter to estimate
a non-linear DSGE model that incorporates the financial frictions a` la Bernanke et al. (1999)
and introduces stochastic volatility to shocks. The results show that our model captures ag-
gregate dynamics relatively well. More importantly, we document that an increase in the
volatility of monetary policy causes a contraction in economic activity: output, consump-
tion, investment, hours worked, and real wages fall. The co-movement of these variables
suggests that monetary volatility shocks may play a certain role in business fluctuations. Re-
garding the role of financial frictions, we find that financial frictions amplify and propagate
the effects of monetary volatility shocks via the financial accelerator mechanism.
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Our work does not examine the impact of monetary volatility shocks under environments
in which there is a zero-lower bound in the nominal interest rate or unconventional mone-
tary policies. Advancing the model to address these issues is an interesting and important
expansion which we would like to consider in the future research.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis developed three essays on monetary policy. Chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence
on the role played by monetary policy in economic outcomes through the analysis of the
historical conduct of monetary policy. Chapter 4 studied the impact of monetary uncertainty
on the economy using a DSGE model with financial frictions.
In Chapter 2, we considered a variety of reaction functions in the context of real time
data to analyze U.K. monetary policy under inflation targeting adopted in 1992. There
were two important features regarding the estimation procedure. First, expected variables
in contemporaneous- and forward-looking rules were forecasted before estimation. Second,
we used the impulse indicator saturation approach to obtain estimates robust to outliers.
We found that monetary policy after 1992 was forward-looking and satisfied the Taylor
principle. Moreover, the response of monetary policy to inflation has been stronger since
the granting of operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997. Importantly, we
showed that failing to deal with outliers can lead to a distorted result that the post-1992
response to inflation was weak, perhaps not satisfying the Taylor principle.
Chapter 3 modeled changes in U.S. monetary policy by taking four issues that have
been highlighted in the literature as crucial into consideration. These issues are: (i) the type
of changes in policy parameters, (ii) the treatment of heteroscedasticity, (iii) the real-time
nature of data, and (iv) the role of asymmetric preferences. The empirical model specifi-
cation was built on the optimal interest rate rule derived from the formal monetary policy
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design problem in which the loss function is asymmetric with respect to inflation. In this
empirical model, we introduced time-varying parameters and dealt with heteroscedasticity
in policy shocks via a stochastic volatility specification. The estimation was based on real-
time data using particle filtering. The findings suggested that the conduct of U.S. monetary
policy could have experienced important changes at the mid-1970s, the late 1970s, and the
early 1990s. Therefore, a single division at the late 1970s as conventionally assumed might
mislead the evaluation of monetary policy.
Finally, Chapter 4 investigated the impacts of the volatility of monetary policy on the
economy in a DSGE model with financial frictions a` la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). The model was estimated for the U.S. economy by maximum likelihood with the
value of the likelihood approximated by particle filtering. The results show that, first, the
model was fairly successful in capturing aggregate dynamics. Second, a positive mone-
tary volatility shock was found to cause a contraction in economic activity. Finally, we
demonstrate that financial frictions amplified and propagated the effects of the shock via
the financial accelerator mechanism. Our results therefore contribute to further advance
understanding of the role played by financial frictions in business fluctuations.
In future research, we would like to expand further the issues discussed in the above
studies. The first direction is to investigate other sources of asymmetric monetary policy.
Regarding the second direction, we would investigate the conduct of monetary policy in
recent years associated with the financial crisis and its consequences. Last but not least, we
would consider the impact of the volatility of monetary policy in different scenarios such as
in a small open economy model or in a model with the zero-lower bound of interest rates.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Estimation with BoE’s Forecasts
This appendix presents the estimates of Taylor rules using BoE’s inflation forecasts in two
cases: with and without the impulse-indicator saturation. See explanations on IIS in the
main text.
Table A.1 Taylor Rule Estimates without IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, using BoE’s Inflation Fore-
casts and Real-time HP Output gap
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Inflation φπ -0.07 -0.13 -0.16** -0.17** -0.17**
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Output Gap φx 0.24* 0.24* 0.25 0.26* 0.26*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Notes: The regression equation is
M1 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+ εt ,
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2007Q4, h =−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q =−1. The columns correspond to different values of h.
Standard errors are given in [.]. *p < 0.01 and **p < 0.05.
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Table A.2 Taylor Rule Estimates with IIS: 1992Q4-2007Q4, using BoE’s Inflation Forecasts
and Real-time HP Output gap
h = 0 h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4
Inflation φπ -0.08 -0.14 -0.16** -0.15** -0.16**
[0.08] [0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Output Gap φx 0.21* 0.22* 0.23* 0.24* 0.24*
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Notes: The regression equation is
M2 : rt = c+ρrt−1+φπEtπt+h+φxEtxt+q+
T
∑
i=1
βi1i=t + εt
for t = 1993Q1, ...,2007Q4, h =−1,0,1,2,3,4 and q =−1. The columns correspond to different values of h.
Standard errors are given in [.]. *p < 0.01 and **p < 0.05.
Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 An Approximation for the Likelihood Value
The likelihood function is derived as follows
p(IT ;ϖ) =
T
∏
t=1
p(it |It−1;ϖ)
=
T
∏
t=1
(∫
p(it |xt ;ϖ)p(xt |It−1;ϖ)dxt
)
=
T
∏
t=1
(∫ ∫
p(it |xt ;ϖ)p(xt |Xt−1;ϖ)p(Xt−1|It−1;ϖ)dXt−1dxt
)
=
T
∏
t=1
(∫ ∫
p(it |xt ;ϖ)p(xt |xt−1;ϖ)p(Xt−1|It−1;ϖ)dXt−1dxt
)
=
T
∏
t=1
(∫ p(it |xt ;ϖ)p(xt |xt−1;ϖ)
π(xt |Xt−1, It) π(xt |Xt−1, It)p(Xt−1|It−1;ϖ)dXt
)
≈
T
∏
t=1
(
1
N
N
∑
k=1
p(it |xkt ;ϖ)p(xkt |xkt−1;ϖ)
π(xkt |Xkt−1, It)
)
=
T
∏
t=1
(
N
∑
k=1
ωk−1t
p(it |xkt ;ϖ)p(xkt |xkt−1;ϖ)
π(xkt |Xkt−1, It)
)
=
T
∏
t=1
(
N
∑
k=1
ωkt
)
.
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In the above derivation, we used an assumption that π(Xt−1|It−1) = π(Xt−1|It).
B.2 Estimates of Time-Invariant Parameters
The estimates of time-invariant parameters are presented in the following table
Means and Standard Deviations of Time-Invariant Parameters
Parameters Means Standard deviations
σa0 −0.86 0.11
σa1 −2.22 0.08
σa2 0.63 0.11
σa3 −2.23 0.14
σa4 −1.10 0.07
σa5 −1.28 0.08
Notes: The table presents the estimates of the time-invariant parameters of the state space system:
it =
1
1+ exp(−a5,t) it−1+
exp(−a5,t)
1+ exp(−a5,t) (a0,t +a1,tπt|t +a2,tσ
2
πt |t +a3,tyt|t)+ exp(a4,t)εt ,
ak,t = ak,t−1+ exp(σak)εak,t , k = 0,1, ...,5.
B.3 Constructing the Contemporaneous Real-Time HP Out-
put Gap Series
In order to construct the contemporaneous real-time HP output gap from 1965Q4 to 2007Q4,
we use two data sets: the Greenbook projections and the real-time data set for macroe-
conomists. Both can be downloaded from the website of the Philadelphia Fed. For more
explanations about real-time data, we refer the readers to Orphanides (2001).
The procedure to construct the contemporaneous real-time HP output gap for a given
quarter i is described as follows:
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Step 1: Collect the entire time-series history perceived at the quarter i vintage (the vintage
is shown at the column header of the real-time data set) which includes the real output
up to the previous quarter. Note that the real output of quarter i is not available to
observe in that quarter. Denote this series by X j:i−1|i = [x j|i,x j+1|i,x j+2|i, ...,xi−1|i]
where j is the first quarter with data recorded in the vintage i data set and xh|i is the
data of real output of the quarter h perceived at the vintage i.
Step 2: Use the Greenbook forecasts for the quarter-to-quarter growth in real GDP (with
quarterized percentage points) to calculate the expected value of real GDP for the
contemporaneous quarter xi|i from xi−1|i. In order to reduce the end-of-sample issue
of the HP filter, we also compute the expected value of real GDP in the following
quarters when the forecasts of the growth rate for those quarters are available at that
vintage.
Step 3: Combine these expected values with the historical series to generate the new series:
X j:i+k|i = [x j|i,x j+1|i,x j+2|i, ...,xi−1|i,xi|i, ...,xi+k|i] where 0≤ k ≤ 4.
Step 4: Apply the HP filter to the series X j:i+k|i to achieve the HP output gap series X∗j:i+k|i =
[x∗j|i,x
∗
j+1|i,x
∗
j+2|i, ...,x
∗
i−1|i,x
∗
i|i, ...,x
∗
i+k|i]. We then record x
∗
i|i as the contemporaneous
real-time HP output gap at the quarter i.
B.4 Asymmetric Preferences to Both Inflation and Output
Gap
The Lagrangian of the policy problem in this case is written as follows
Min
πt ,yt ,it
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−α(πt −π∗)−1
α2
+µ
[
e(λyt)−λyt −1
λ 2
]
+
γ
2
(it − i∗)2
−φπt (πt −κyt − εst )−φ yt (yt +ϕit − εdt )
}
,
(B.1)
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in which φπt and φ
y
t are the Lagrange multipliers. It is straightforward to derive the first-
order optimal conditions
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
−φπt
}
= 0,
Et(γ(it − i∗)−φ yt ϕ) = 0,
Et
{
µ
eλyt −1
λ
+φπt κ−φ yt
}
= 0.
Combine these conditions to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers
Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
κ+
eλyt −1
λ
µ− γ
ϕ
(it − i∗)
}
= 0. (B.2)
Then the central bank sets the interest rate in order to respond to inflation and output devia-
tions
it = i∗+Et
{eα(πt−π∗)−1
α
κϕ
γ
+
eλyt −1
λ
µϕ
γ
}
. (B.3)
and the above expression can be approximated as
it = i∗+Et
{κϕ
γ
(πt −π∗)+ κϕα2γ (πt −π
∗)2+
µϕ
γ
yt +
µϕλ
2γ
y2t
}
= i∗+
κϕ
γ
Et(πt −π∗)+ κϕα2γ Et(πt −π
∗)2+
µϕ
γ
Etyt +
µϕλ
2γ
Ety2t
= (i∗− κϕ
γ
π∗)+
κϕ
γ
πt|t +
κϕα
2γ
σ2πt |t +
µϕ
γ
yt|t +
µϕλ
2γ
σ2yt |t
= b0+b1πt|t ++b2σ2πt |t +b3yt|t +b4σ
2
yt |t ,
(B.4)
where b0 = i∗− κϕγ π∗, b1 = κϕγ , b2 = κϕα2γ , b3 = µϕγ , b4 = µϕλ2γ and σ2yt |t is the expected
variance of unemployment gap conditional on the information available at time t. Other
notations are as in the baseline model.
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B.4.1 Expected Variance of Output Gap
The process of generating the expected variance of output gap series is similar to the one
used to create the expected variance of inflation series in Section 3.4.2. The model specifi-
cation used is given by
yt = c+
3
∑
i=1
βiyt−i+ϕit +
3
∑
j=1
ψiπt− j + εt , (B.5)
where the output gap is proxied by the 5-year moving average gap. This specification is
derived from the IS curve equation (3.3) by substituting the expectations by a linear combi-
nation of lags of inflation and the output gap.
Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Choice of Density Function for ψt
Then, one can draw that Et(ψt+1) = 1. Some other outputs can be calculated including
F(ψt) =Φ(zt)
G(ψt) =
∫ ψt
0
ψ f (ψ)dψ
= 1−
∫ ∞
ψt
ψ f (ψ)dψ
= 1−Φ(σψeσψt − zt)
=Φ(zt −σψeσψt )
Γ(ψt) = ψt(1−Φ(zt))+Φ(zt −σψeσψt )
G
′
(ψt) = ψtf(ψt)
Γ
′
(ψt) = 1−F(ψt)
where zt = (
log(ψt)+0.5σ2ψe
2σψt
σψeσψt
), f(ψ) is the p.d.f of ψ , and Φ(.) is the standard normal c.d.f.
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C.2 Data Sources and Construction
The original time series’ sources are summarized as follows
• RGDP: Real Domestic Product, Billions of chained (2005) dollars, Seasonally ad-
justed at annual rates, Bureau of Economic Analysis Table 1.1.6, line 1
• GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF), Index 2009=
100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted, Federal Reserve Economic Data
• LNU00000000Q: Labor force status: Civilian noninstitutional population; Bureau of
Labor Statistics
• LNS10000000Q: Labor force status: Civilian noninstitutional population; Bureau of
Labor Statistics (Before 1976: LNU00000000Q)
• LNSindex: LNS10000000Q(2005 : 2) = 1
• FFR: Federal Funds Rate; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
• BAA: Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yields; Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis
The four observable data used in the estimation are constructed as below
• ROUTt = LN
(
RGDPt
LNSindext
)
• OUTt = ROUTt −ROUT t in which ROUT t is the potential output per capital filtered
by the Hodrick-Prescott method.
• INPt = LN
(
GDPDEFt
GDPDEFt−1
)
demeanded
• INRt = FFRt/400demeanded
• CBYt = BAAt/400demeanded
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C.3 Particle Filter Algorithm
The model considered above belongs to a larger class of non-linear and/or non-normal dy-
namic macroeconomic models which can be written generally in the following state-space
system. First, the law of motion for the state vector xt is given by
xt = h(xt−1,wt ;Ξ) (C.1)
where wt is a random vector of innovations, in our specific case wt includes structural and
volatility shocks, with dimension nw and Ξ is the vector of parameters of the model. Second,
the set of observables denoted by zt are connected to the state variables xt by the measure-
ment equation
zt = g(xt ,vt ;Ξ) (C.2)
where vt is a random vector of measurement errors. To be convenient, we assume indepen-
dence between vt and wt . The functions h and g come from the equations that characterize
the behavior of the model. The particle filter algorithm is presented below.
Particle Filter Algorithm
• Initialization t = 0
Draw N particles x(i)0 , i = 1,2, ..,N , from p(x0;Ξ) and let π
(i)
0 =
1
N for all i.
• Propagation
Draw N particles x(i)t , i = 1,2, ..,N , from p(xt |xˆ(i)t−1;Ξ).
• Importance weights
Evaluate the importance weights π(i)t , i = 1,2, ..,N
π(i)t = π
(i)
t−1 p(zt |x(i)t ;Ξ)
• Log-Likelihood Contribution
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logLt = logLt−1+ log(
N
∑
i=1
π(i)t )
• Normalization
Normalize the importance weights π(i)t , i = 1,2, ..,N
π˜(i)t =
π(i)t
∑Ni=1π
(i)
t
• Resampling step
We use the systematic resampling algorithm to generate a new set of particles {xˆ( j)t }Nj=1
by resampling (with replacement) from the existing particles {x(i)t }Ni=1 with probabil-
ity {πˆ(i)t }Ni=1.
• Propagation
Set t = t+1 and go to Step 2: Propagation
Systematic Resampling Algorithm
• Construction of the cumulative sum of weights (CSW)
Let c1 = π˜1t and define ci = ci−1+ π˜
(i)
t for i = 2, ...,N
• Resampling step
Generate a starting point from a uniform distribution: u1 ∼U [0,N−1] and define u j =
u1+N−1( j−1) for j = 2, ...,N. For each j = 1, ...,N, find i = 1, ...,N to satisfy
c(i−1)≤ u( j)≤ c(i)
- Assign sample: s( j)
∗
k = x
(i)
k
- Assign weight: π( j)t = N−1
